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Abstract
The prediction of a binary sequence is a classic example of online machine learning. We like to
call it the “stock prediction problem,” viewing the sequence as the price history of a stock that goes
up or down one unit at each time step. In this problem, an investor has access to the predictions of
two or more “experts,” and strives to minimize her final-time regret with respect to the best-performing
expert. Probability plays no role; rather, the market is assumed to be adversarial. We consider the case
when there are two history-dependent experts, whose predictions are determined by the d most recent
stock moves. Focusing on an appropriate continuum limit and using methods from optimal control, graph
theory, and partial differential equations, we discuss strategies for the investor and the adversarial market,
and we determine associated upper and lower bounds for the investor’s final-time regret. When d ≤ 4 our
upper and lower bounds coalesce, so the proposed strategies are asymptotically optimal. Compared to
other recent applications of partial differential equations to prediction, ours has a new element: there are
two timescales, since the recent history changes at every step whereas regret accumulates more slowly.
1 Introduction
Prediction with expert advice is an area of online machine learning [6], in which an agent has access to
several experts’ predictions and uses them to make a prediction of her own. Probabilistic modeling is not
involved; instead, the agent’s goal is to “minimize regret” – i.e. to minimize her worst-case shortfall with
respect to the (retrospectively) best-performing expert.
Much of the vast literature in this area explores easily-implemented prediction strategies, assessing
their performance on broad classes of prediction problems. Our focus is different: we examine a special
example – the prediction of a binary sequence using guidance from two history-dependent experts (described
informally below, and more formally in Section 2) – looking for prediction strategies that take into account
the character of the example. Our work is interesting because:
(a) we show how considering a scaled version of the problem facilitates the use of PDE methods;
(b) we show how the study of history-dependent experts leads naturally to the use of graph-theoretic
methods; and
(c) we identify asymptotically optimal strategies when the experts use only the most recent d ≤ 4 stock
moves.
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(We only consider two experts, and when d ≥ 5 our strategies might not be optimal. Subsequent to the
work presented here, the first author and J. Calder have obtained further results, identifying asymptotically
optimal strategies for any value of d and any number of history-dependent experts [4]. The methods used in
that work are somewhat different from – and complementary to – those of the present paper.)
The idea that scaling should facilitate the use of PDE methods is not unprecedented. Our prediction
problem can be viewed as a two-person game, and the PDE describes the value of the game in an appropriate
scaling limit. Other two-person games leading similarly to nonlinear parabolic equations have been studied,
for example, in [2, 3, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. Much of this literature uses viscosity-solution techniques, which
are required when the solution of the relevant PDE is not smooth. In this paper we don’t need viscosity
solutions, since our PDE has a smooth solution; as a result, our arguments are rather elementary, using what
a control theorist would call “verification arguments.”
While the standard name for our problem is the “prediction of a binary sequence using expert advice,”
we like to call it the “stock prediction problem,” viewing the sequence as the price history of a stock that
goes up or down one unit at each time step. The case with two static experts (one who always predicts
the stock will go up, the other who always predicts the stock will go down) has a long history, going back
at least to Thomas Cover’s 1965 paper [7]. A concise treatment can be found in Section 8.4 of [6]. The
optimal strategies can be determined using dynamic programming, and the predictor’s worst-case regret has
an explicit formula, involving the expected value of a function of many Bernoulli random variables. When
the number of steps is large, the explicit formula can be evaluated using the central limit theorem. An
alternative PDE-based perspective on this continuum limit was developed by Kangping Zhu in [23]; roughly
speaking, it takes the continuum limit of the dynamic programming principle rather than the explicit solution
formula.
In this paper we consider two history-dependent experts, whose predictions depend on the most recent
d ≥ 1 stock movements. Our overall approach is similar to that of [23] – which is only natural, since
when d = 0 the experts are static rather than history-dependent. When d ≥ 1, however, the problem
is fundamentally different from those considered by Cover [7] and Zhu [23]. Briefly: regret accumulates
slowly, while the recent history changes quickly. In more detail: if the stock price moves by ±1 at each
time step then the worst-case regret should be of order
√
N after N time steps, by arguments related to
Blackwell’s approachability theorem (see e.g. Chapter 2 of [6]). So the regret increases about 1/
√
N per
time step, which is small (since we are interested in the asymptotic behavior as N → ∞). The recent
history, by contrast, is different at each time step. Thus for history-dependent experts the problem has two
well-separated time scales. In our analysis, the fast timescale is handled using graph-theoretic methods,
while the slow timescale is handled using methods analogous to those of [23].
Here is an informal description of our version of the stock prediction problem. Consider a stock whose
price goes up or down one unit at each time step. An investor can invest (at each timestep) in −1 ≤ f ≤ 1
units of stock. There are two experts, whose investment choices are determined by two functions (call them
q and r) of the most recent d stock moves. The clock stops after N time steps, and the investor’s goal
is to minimize her worst-case final-time shortfall (i.e. “regret”) with respect to the (retrospectively) best-
performing expert. Since the focus is on worst-case behavior, this is a two-person game, whose players are
the investor and an adversarial market (which chooses the price history so as to maximize the investor’s final-
time regret). To be clear: the final time N and the experts’ investment rules q and r are public information.
At the kth timestep, the investor announces her investment fk, then the market chooses whether the stock
goes up (bk = 1) or down (bk = −1); these determine the investor’s gain bkfk and also the experts’ gains
bkq(mk) and bkr(mk); here mk represents k days of history prior to timestep k. (For a more complete
description see Section 2.1.)
The investor’s worst-case final-time regret can in principle be determined by dynamic programming,
using as state variables the investor’s regret with respect to each expert and the past d stock price moves
(see Section 2.3). But one can do better by taking advantage of the fact that regret accumulates slowly
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while the recent history changes at each time step. Indeed, as time proceeds the sequence of recent histories
determines a walk on a certain directed graph (see Section 2.2). Simplifying somewhat, let us suppose that
the market’s choices involve well-selected cycles on this graph (a key task in our analysis of the investor’s
strategy will be to justify this simplification). Then the rapidly-changing recent history can be accounted
for by considering, for each cycle, how regret accumulates if the market chooses that cycle. This gives an
estimate of the worst-case final-time regret that’s independent of the recent history – a function only of the
investor’s regret with respect to each expert and number of timesteps that remain. (The case when only
d = 1 timestep of history is used is especially transparent; it is discussed in detail in Section 3.)
This game is discrete (in much the way that random walk on a lattice is discrete). To connect the
game with a PDE we consider a scaling limit (entirely analogous to the way that scaled random walks
lead to Brownian motion, whose backward Kolmogorov equation is the linear heat equation). To explain
heuristically, suppose v(j, y1, y2) is the worst-case regret at the final time N , given that the investor’s regret
with respect to experts 1 and 2 are y1 and y2 at timestep j (and ignoring for now the importance of the recent
history). As already noted above, we expect v to be of order
√
N when (y1, y2) = (0, 0) and j = 0, by
arguments related to Blackwell’s theorem. Therefore it is natural to consider the rescaled regret u = v/
√
N
as a function of x = y/
√
N and t = j/N . Writing ε = 1/
√
N , the rescaled dynamic programming principle
for u involves spatial steps of order ε and timesteps of order ε2. The relevant PDE for u(x, t) is, roughly
speaking, the one for which this rescaled dynamic programming principle is a convergent numerical scheme
in the limit ε→ 0.
The preceding discussion of scaling neglects the importance of the recent stock price history. In fact,
we identify a limiting PDE for the investor’s worst-case regret only when the experts use up to d = 4 days
of history. This is because we achieve a full understanding of how the stock price history determines the
players’ optimal choices only when d ≤ 4. But we also have results for d > 4, involving upper (respectively
lower) bounds for the worst-case regret, obtained by solving PDEs associated with specific strategies for the
investor (respectively the market).
The PDE’s that emerge are 2nd-order nonlinear parabolic equations, solved backward in time. Such
PDE are commonly seen in stochastic control; here the second-order character comes not from stochasticity,
but rather from the game’s Hannan consistency (a situation analogous to that of [16]). Based on our account
of the game, the final-time value should be ϕ(x1, x2) = max{x1, x2}, since the predictor’s goal was to
minimize her worst-case regret with respect to the best-performing expert, i.e. max{y1, y2}. (Since this
function is homogeneous of degree one, the passage from regret to scaled regret does not change its form.)
It is, however, both natural and convenient to consider the scaled dynamic programming principle with a
more general final-time value ϕ(x). Indeed, our methods rely on the smoothness of u, so they require ϕ to
be sufficiently smooth. We adapt them to the classic case ϕ(x) = max{x1, x2} by approximating it (above
or below) by a smooth function.
What are the PDE’s? Actually, there is essentially just one PDE. It is convenient to change variables to
ξ = x1 − x2 and η = x1 + x2. The PDE is then
ut + Cu
−2
η
(
uξξu
2
η − 2uξηuξuη + uηηu2ξ
)
= 0 for t < T (1.1)
with the final-time condition u(T, ξ, η) = ϕ(ξ, η). The constant C must of course be chosen properly; it
reflects the rate at which regret accumulates (see Section 2.3 for an account of how such a PDE emerges from
the dynamic programming principle). The PDE (1.1) looks very nonlinear, but it simplifies dramatically
when the final-time condition has the form ϕ(ξ, η) = cη + ϕ(ξ). (Note that the classic choice max(x1, x2)
has this form, since it equals 12(η + |ξ|).) Then it is natural to expect that u(t, ξ, η) = cη + u(t, ξ), and
substitution of this ansatz into the PDE gives the linear heat equation ut + Cuξξ = 0 with the final-time
condition u = ϕ at t = T . Surprisingly, something similar can be done for a much broader class of
final-time conditions ϕ(ξ, η). Indeed, assuming certain structural conditions on ϕ, for each y the level set
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u(t, ξ, η) = y has the form η = h(t, ξ; y) where h solves a linear heat equation in ξ and t, with appropriate
final-time data. This is explained in [23]; we offer a self-contained treatment as an Appendix.
How is the investor’s strategy linked to the PDE? For two static experts (i.e. when the two experts make
no use of the recent stock price history) the investor’s optimal strategy resembles what is known in the
literature as a potential-based strategy, using the solution of the PDE as a (time-dependent) potential [23].
In our history dependent setting, the situation is quite different: the investor’s optimal strategies depend on
the recent stock price history as well as on the solution of the PDE. Our analysis suggests that if the recent
history is m, the investor should buy fm = f∗m + εf
#
m units of stock. The leading-order term f∗m is state-
dependent, but it is nevertheless obtained by using the solution of the PDE as something like a potential;
the correction εf#m is obtained by an entirely different argument, involving the graph that represents the
evolution of stock price histories (see Sections 2.4, 3.1, and 4.1 for further information in this direction).
What about the market’s strategies? Briefly (and informally), knowing that the investor should choose
a strategy of the form fm = f∗m + εf
#
m , the market identifies a particular choice of f
#
m that works to its
advantage, and “forces” the investor to use this strategy by penalizing other choices (see Sections 2.4, 3.2
and 4.2 for further information in this direction).
To put our work in context with respect to the online machine learning literature, we note that there are
numerous articles on the “prediction of binary sequences,” of which [5] is representative. In much of this
literature, the focus is on identifying easily-implemented strategies for the predictor (involving “potential
functions” for example) that work relatively well (assuring regret of order at most
√
N after N timesteps).
Our focus is different: we would like to understand an asymptotically optimal strategy for the predictor, and
the optimal prefactor of
√
N in the estimate of the worst-case regret. This requires identifying asymptot-
ically optimal strategies for the market as well as for the predictor. Such a complete understanding has to
date been achieved for only a few prediction problems. In the present paper we achieve such clarity when
the history-dependence involves at most d = 4 recent stock movements. For d > 4, as noted above, we ob-
tain upper and lower bounds for the worst-case regret, but we don’t know whether they match; this question
reduces, as we explain in Section 4, to one about the cycles in certain de Bruijn graphs.
The online machine learning literature is not restricted to the prediction of sequences. A different class
of examples focuses directly on the experts’ outcomes, letting those be determined directly (rather than
through a time series) by the market. (A PDE-based discussion of one such problem can be found in [9],
and a PDE perspective on potential-based strategies can be found in [14, 15, 21]; PDE methods have also
been applied to another class of problems known as “drifting games” [11].) In the present setting the experts’
outcomes are highly constrained, since (i) their progress must be consistent with a time series, and (ii) their
predictions depend, at a given time, on the past d items in that time series. The graph-theoretic methods we
use to deal with the fast time scale are essentially a means for understanding the effect of these constraints.
Perhaps related methods might be useful for some other prediction problems with similar constraints on the
experts’ advice.
In a generic problem involving prediction of sequences, the goal might be to actually guess the next
element of the sequence. In such a setting the “loss function” would measure the error; a typical example
would be the “absolute value loss” |f − bk|. In the stock prediction problem the situation is different – the
investor and the experts focus instead on how much money they gain or lose. This seems at first glance very
different from the absolute value loss; however in the context of the stock prediction problem (where each
stock move bk is limited to ±1, and the focus is exclusively on cumulative regret) the use of absolute value
loss rather than financial loss would not really change matters. (This fact is well-known and elementary; for
completeness we nevertheless review it in Section 2.1.)
We briefly highlight a few recent papers with connections to our work. The stock prediction problem
with two static experts, a discounted payoff, and no final time was studied in [1]. The focus there (like
here) is on identification of the investor’s and the market’s optimal behavior. While the paper’s methods
seem somewhat different from ours, differential equations do play a fundamental role. A related though
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somewhat different discussion can be found in Section 1.5.2 of [23], where the problem is considered for a
discounted payoff and a fixed final time.
The stock prediction problem with two static experts is a special case of a more general class of problems
studied in [13]. The focus there is rather different from ours: rather than considering just the predictor’s
regret (i.e. her shortfall with respect to the best-performing expert), the paper [13] discusses algorithms that
limit the worst-case loss as well as the worst-case regret. The analysis there permits any number of experts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets the stage, by presenting our problem in full
detail and linking it heuristically to our PDE; it closes, in Section 2.6, with a summary of our main results.
Section 3 proves our upper and lower bounds in the special case when the experts use only d = 1 days
of history; this case is treated separately because it is relatively transparent, while still capturing the main
ideas used for general d. Section 4 introduces the graph-based methods used to determine the investor’s and
market’s strategies. A good strategy for the investor leads to an upper bound for the worst-case final-time
regret, while a good strategy for the market leads to a lower bound for the same quantity; our proofs of these
bounds occupies Section 5. Our analysis relies on the PDE (1.1) having a sufficiently smooth solution (with
uniformly bounded derivatives) when the final-time function ϕ satisfies some structural properties. The
required estimates follow easily from basic facts about the linear heat equation when the final-time function
has the form ϕ(ξ, η) = cη + ϕ(ξ). They are, however, valid for a broader class of final-time functions ϕ;
this is proved in [23] but we provide a self-contained treatment here as an Appendix, for the convenience of
the reader.
2 Getting started
This section describes our problem in detail and provides a heuristic discussion of our approach. It closes,
in Section 2.6, with a summary of our main results.
2.1 The game
The stock prediction problem is a zero-sum, two-person, sequential game played by the investor and the
market. We represent the stock movements by a binary data stream b1, b2, . . ., each with value −1 or +1.
Since our experts make their predictions using d days of history, we need some notation for the most
recent d stock movements (the current “state”). While the obvious representation is (bk−d, . . . , bk−1) at time
k, it is convenient to use binary notation instead, recording −1 as 0 and +1 as 1. With this convention, the
state at time k is
mk =
1
2
(bk−d + 1, . . . , bk−1 + 1) ∈ {0, 1}d,
which can be viewed as an integer ranging from 0 to 2d − 1.
At each time step the investor can buy |f | ≤ 1 units of stock. Her choice of f can be viewed as a
prediction, since if she buys fk shares at time k and the stock then moves by bk, she has a profit of bkfk (or a
loss, if this is negative). Our two history-dependent experts’ predictions are expressed similarly: the experts
are characterized by two functions q(m) and r(m), defined on {0, 1}d, which represent their investment
choices. The experts should of course not be identical,
q(m) 6= r(m) for at least one state m, (2.1)
and their guidance should be admissible: |q(m)| ≤ 1 and |r(m)| ≤ 1 for all m. For technical reasons, we
need the preceding inequalities to be strict:
we assume that |q(m)| < 1 and |r(m)| < 1 for all states m. (2.2)
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(This condition assures that the investor’s leading-order bid f∗m satisfies |f∗m| < 1, as we’ll see in Section
2.5.)
Following the convention of the prediction literature, we focus on the investor’s and the experts’ losses
rather than their gains. In terms of the financial loss function
l(f, bk) = −fbk (2.3)
the investor’s and experts’ losses due to stock movement k are evidently l(fk, bk), l(qk, bk), and l(rk, bk), if
the investor’s prediction is f , the recent history ismk, and the experts’ bids are qk = q(mk) and rk = r(mk).
So the investor’s regret (or shortfall, or relative loss) with respect to expert q at step k is
l(f, bk)− l(qk, bk) = −fbk + qkbk = bk(qk − f), (2.4)
and her regret with respect to expert r at step k is similarly
l(f, bk)− l(rk, bk) = −fbk + rkbk = bk(rk − f). (2.5)
The investor’s cumulative regret is a key quantity, since it captures her overall performance compared to the
experts. We record the cumulative regret with respect to experts q and r by (x1, x2). To be explicit: if the
investor’s prediction at step k is fk then after the M th step,
x1 =
M∑
k=1
l(fk, bk)− l(qk, bk) and x2 =
M∑
k=1
l(fk, bk)− l(rk, bk). (2.6)
The language of investment makes the financial loss function l(f, b) = −fb seem very natural. But (as
noted in the Introduction) the situation would be no different if we used the absolute value loss function
l′(f, b) = |f − b|. Indeed, since b takes only the values ±1, the associated regret with respect to expert q at
time k would be
l′(f, bk)− l′(qk, bk) = |f − bk| − |qk − bk| = bk(qk − f)
and similarly the associated regret with respect to expert r would be bk(rk − f). Comparing with (2.4)–
(2.5), we see that when only the regret (rather than the total loss) is being considered, the financial loss and
absolute value loss functions are equivalent.
When the game starts there is no history; we suppose the two experts have some rule for handling this
(for example qk = rk = 0 if 1 ≤ k ≤ d). The specific choice of this rule will have no effect on our analysis,
since we are interested in what happens over many time steps.
2.2 The underlying graph
Since the state m ∈ {0, 1}d records the recent history, it changes from one step to the next. For example, if
d = 2 and the most recent moves were bk−2 = −1 and bk−1 = 1 then mk = (0, 1) and the next state mk+1
can be either (1, 1) (if bk = 1) or (1, 0) (if bk = −1). Introducing some notation: if the current state is m,
we define
m+ = subsequent state if bk = 1, and
m− = subsequent state if bk = −1.
Thus when
m =
1
2
(bk−d + 1, . . . , bk−1 + 1) ∈ {0, 1}d
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we have
m+ =
1
2
(bk−d+1 + 1, ..., bk−1 + 1, 2), and
m− =
1
2
(bk−d+1 + 1, ..., bk−1 + 1, 0).
As the game proceeds, the sequence of states can be visualized using an appropriate directed graph. It has
the states as vertices, and each vertex m is connected to m+ and m−; the case d = 2 is shown in Figure 1.
Evidently the graph has 2d vertices; each vertex has exactly two outgoing edges; and each vertex has exactly
two incoming edges. It is, in fact, a well-studied graph, known as the d-dimensional de Bruijn graph on 2
symbols (see e.g. page 61 of [22]).
Figure 1: the underlying graph, when d = 2.
Our analysis uses the well-known fact that a closed walk can be decomposed as a union of simple cycles.
To keep our treatment self-contained, we review the relevant definitions and give the proof of this result.
Definition 2.1. A closed walk is a list of vertices and edges a0, e1, a1, . . . , ek, ak such that the initial and
final vertices are the same (ak = a0), and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k the edge ei has endpoints ai−1 and ai.
Definition 2.2. A simple cycle is a walk without repeated vertices apart from the first one and the last one,
which are equal.
Where it introduces no confusion, we will identify a cycle by listing its vertices in order. As an example,
when d = 2 (the case shown in Figure 1) there are 6 simple cycles: two with length one (00 and 33), one
with length two (121), two with length three (0120 and 1321), and one with length four (01321).
Lemma 2.3. A closed walk on a directed graph is a union of simple cycles.
Proof. The argument is constructive. Given a closed walk, consider the list of vertices it visits (in order):
a0, a1, a2, . . . , ak. (By hypothesis, a0 = ak). Now start traversing the walk, and consider the first time a
vertex is repeated: ai = aj with j > i. Evidently ai, ai+1, . . . , aj is a simple cycle. Remove this simple
cycle from the walk, keeping ai. This gives a new (shorter) closed walk, to which the same argument can be
applied. Continuing, we eventually get a walk that has no repetitions aside from its intial and final vertices.
It is evidently a simple cycle, so the proof is complete.
2.3 The dynamic programming principle before and after scaling
The investor’s worst-case regret is determined by a dynamic programming principle. The goal of this sub-
section is to make this explicit. As already explained in the introduction, our main focus will be on a scaled
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version of the game, and we’ll get to that presently. But first we discuss the dynamic programming problem
for the game described by Section 2.2.
Recall that the investor’s cumulative regret is recorded by (x1, x2). As already noted in the Introduction,
it is convenient to work with ξ = x1 − x2 and η = x1 + x2. If the investor’s choice at step k is fk then the
change in x associated with actions at step k is, according to (2.4)–(2.6), ∆x = [bk(qk − fk), bk(rk − fk)].
So the changes in ξ and η are ∆ξ = bk(qk − rk) and ∆η = bk(qk + rk − 2fk). We suppose the game ends
at step N (i.e. the last prediction is made at k = N − 1).
The dynamic programming principle determines the function
U(k,m, ξ, η) =
{
the investor’s worst-case minimum final-time regret at step k, if the recent history is m,
the value of x1 − x2 (based on times through k − 1) is ξ, and the value of x1 + x2 is η,
by working backward in time: for k ≤ N − 1
U(k,m, ξ, η) = min
|f |≤1
max
bk=±1
U
(
k + 1,mbk , ξ + bk[q(m)− r(m)], η + bk[q(m) + r(m)− 2f ]
)
, (2.7)
wherembk denotes the next state, which is determined fromm by the value of bk. Since the investor’s regret
with respect to the best-performing expert is max{x1, x2} = (η + |ξ|)/2, the final-time condition is
U(N,m, ξ, η) =
η + |ξ|
2
. (2.8)
Our hypotheses about the flow of information are reflected by the min-max in (2.7): the investor chooses f
knowing that the adversarial market will see her choice and do whatever is worst for her.
We are interested in what happens over large numbers of steps. As discussed in the Introduction, we
expect U(1,m, 0, 0) ∼ √N . Therefore it is natural to scale time by N and regret by √N . Writing ε =
1/
√
N , the scaled version of U is
uε(t,m, ξ, η) = εU
(
t
ε2
,m,
ξ
ε
,
η
ε
)
.
It is defined for times t that are multiples of ε2 = 1/N between 0 and 1. The dynamic programming
principle (2.7) is equivalent to
uε(t,m, ξ, η) = min
|f |≤1
max
bt=±1
uε
(
t+ ε2,mbt , ξ + εbt[q(m)− r(m)], η + εbt[q(m) + r(m)− 2f ]
)
(2.9)
with the same final-time condition as before:
uε(1,m, ξ, η) =
η + |ξ|
2
. (2.10)
Our goal is to study u = limε→0 uε by combining ideas from PDE and graph theory. In our study of
the continuum limit, it is natural to consider any final time T (rather than just T = 1), and it is natural to
consider other final-time conditions (not just (η + |ξ|)/2). Therefore we shall henceforth assume that uε
satisfies (2.9) up to a fixed final time T , with a more general final-time condition
uε(T,m, ξ, η) = ϕ(ξ, η). (2.11)
Our analysis requires some conditions on the final-time condition ϕ; these will be discussed in Section 2.5.
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2.4 A formal connection to PDE
To see a connection with PDE, we begin by ignoring the dependence of uε on ε and m, and combining the
dynamic programming principle (2.9) with Taylor expansion. Replacing uε by u in (2.9) and assuming u is
sufficiently smooth, this gives
u(t,m, ξ, η) = min
|ft,m|≤1
max
bt=±1
u
(
t+ ε2,mbt , ξ + εbt[q(m)− r(m)], η + εbt[q(m) + r(m)− 2f ]
)
= min
|ft,m|≤1
max
bt=±1
{
u(t,m, ξ, η) + εA+ ε2B +O(ε3)
}
(2.12)
with
A = bt
(
[q(m)− r(m)]uξ + [q(m) + r(m)− 2ft,m]uη
)
(2.13)
and
B = ut +
〈D2u[q(m)− r(m), q(m) + r(m)− 2ft,m], [q(m)− r(m), q(m) + r(m)− 2ft,m]〉
2
. (2.14)
In the latter expression, D2u is the Hessian of u with respect to its spatial variables ξ and η:
D2u =
(
uξξ uξη
uξη uηη
)
. (2.15)
The order ε0 term in the min-max (2.12) is not interesting – it is independent of ft,m and bt, and in fact it
cancels with the u that’s on the left. So the first interesting term in the min-max is εA. If it is nonzero,
then the market can choose the sign of bt to make this term positive – a bad outcome for the investor. It
is tempting to conclude that the investor’s choice of ft,m should make A vanish, but that’s not quite right.
Rather, the investor’s choice of ft,m should make this term small enough that it interacts with the ε2 term.
This occurs when A = O(ε), i.e.
[q(m)− r(m)]uξ + [q(m) + r(m)− 2ft,m]uη = O(ε),
or equivalently
ft,m =
[q(m)− r(m)]uξ + [q(m) + r(m)]uη
2uη
+O(ε).
So the investor’s choice should take the form
ft,m = f
∗
t,m + εf
#
t,m (2.16)
with
f∗t,m =
[q(m)− r(m)]uξ + [q(m) + r(m)]uη
2uη
. (2.17)
(We shall explain later, in Section 2.5, why this choice is admissible – that is, why |ft,m| ≤ 1 – under
suitable hypotheses upon the final-time function ϕ.) When ft,m has the form (2.16), the “first-order term”
from the Taylor expansion becomes
εA = εbt
(
[q(m)− r(m)]uξ + [q(m) + r(m)− 2(f∗t,m + εf#t,m)]uη
)
= −ε22btuηf#t,m.
As for the “second-order term” ε2B: evaluating B at f∗t,m rather than ft,m introduces an error of order ε;
this leads (after some algebra) to
ε2B = ε2
(
ut + (q(m)− r(m))2 1
2
〈D2u∇
⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉
)
+O(ε3), (2.18)
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using the notation
∇⊥u = (−uη, uξ). (2.19)
Summarizing the preceding calculation: when f has the form (2.16), (2.12) reduces (after division by ε2) to
0 = min
f#t,m
max
bt=±1
{
ut + (q(m)− r(m))2 1
2
〈D2u · ∇
⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉 − 2btuηf#t,m
}
(2.20)
if we ignore the error associated with higher-order terms in the Taylor expansion.
We have thus far ignored the possible dependence of u on m. It seems from (2.20) that u should indeed
depend on the state m as well as on t, ξ, and η. This would be a mess, since we would need to keep track of
how the states evolve.
In fact, the function u we want is a little different from the one discussed thus far. The min-max should
be over the players’ (multistep) strategies, and the expression under the min-max should involve the time-
averaged value of the expression under the min-max in (2.20). By proceeding this way, we shall obtain a
function u that depends only on time and space (not on the current state).
To avoid unwieldy expressions, we introduce the notation
Dk :=
1
2
〈D2u · ∇
⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉, (2.21)
where the right hand side is evaluated at time tk and location ξk, ηk. The expression to be time-averaged is
thus
L(tk,m, b, ξk, ηk, f
#
tk,m
) := ut + (q(m)− r(m))2Dk − 2buηf#tk,m. (2.22)
To identify the optimal strategies and implement the time averaging, let us focus on the case d = 1, for
which the graph is shown in Figure 2. It has three simple cycles: 0− 0, 1− 1, and 0− 1− 0. The investor
Figure 2: The directed graph when d = 1.
knows that the market could choose to simply repeat one of these cycles. For the cycle 0− 0, the value of L
is
L(tk, 0,−1, ξk, ηk, f#tk,0) = ut + (q(0)− r(0))2Dk − 2(−1)uηf
#
tk,0
; (2.23)
for the cycle 1− 1 it is
L(tk, 1, 1, ξk, ηk, f
#
tk,1
) = ut + (q(1)− r(1))2Dk − 2(+1)uηf#tk,1; (2.24)
for the two-step cycle 0− 1− 0 the time-averaged value is
1
2
{L(tk, 1,−1, ξk, ηk, f#tk,1) + L(tk, 0, 1, ξk, ηk, f
#
tk,0
)}
= ut +
1
2
{(q(1)− r(1))2Dk − 2(−1)uηf#tk,1 + (q(0)− r(0))2Dk − 2(+1)uηf
#
tk,0
}.
Knowing that the market is adversarial, the investor assumes that the market will choose whichever cycle
gives her the worst result, and chooses f#t,m to optimize the outcome associated with the worst-case cycle.
This leads, for general d, to a linear program (the “investor’s linear program” studied in Section 4.1). For d =
10
1, however, the solution of the linear program has a simple and intuitive character: the best choice of f#t,m is
the one that makes the investor indifferent with respect to the three simple cycles. (A similar phenomenon
occurs for d = 2, 3, 4, as we will show in Section 4.4.) Writing D = Dk (a harmless convention, since
Dk changes only slightly at each timestep) and writing αm rather than f
#
t,m (a significant choice, since it
restricts the investor’s strategy to depend on time only through the state m and the values of uη and D), the
condition for indifference is that α0 and α1 satisfy
(q(1)− r(1))2D − 2uηα1 = (q(0)− r(0))2D + 2uηα0
=
1
2
[
(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2]D + uηα1 − uηα0.
This amounts to two linear equations in the two unknowns α0 and α1; the unique solution is easily seen to
be
α0 = α1 =
(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2
4uη
D
and the time-averaged value of L for each cycle is then
ut +
(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2
2
D. (2.25)
Taking this choice of strategy into account, we obtain from (2.20) the desired PDE for the case d = 1:
ut +
1
2
C#1 〈D2u
∇⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉 = 0 (2.26)
with
C#1 =
(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2
2
. (2.27)
It is to be solved for t < T , with final-time data u = ϕ at time T .
The preceding derivation is of course quite heuristic. We will justify it with full mathematical rigor in
Section 3. The ideas presented above provide a strategy for the investor, and the outline of a proof that
by following it she can do at least as well as the solution of the PDE. The heuristic argument considered
only simple cycles, while the rigorous one (presented in Section 3.1) must consider any possible actions the
market might take. This is where Lemma 2.3 comes in: while the market’s choices might not produce a walk
that’s restricted to a simple cycle, the walk they produce can be decomposed as a union of simple cycles –
so a strategy that works well for every simple cycle actually works well for every walk.
How do we know there is no better strategy for the investor? This will be shown in Section 3.2 by
considering a particular strategy for the market. Briefly, the strategy “forces” the investor to use the values
of f∗m and f
#
m identified by our heuristic argument, by penalizing other choices.
Our heuristic discussion has focused on the case d = 1. The cases d = 2, 3, 4 are similar, since in those
cases too the parameters f#m can be chosen to make the investor indifferent with respect to the various simple
cycles; the associated PDEs have the same form as (2.26), except that the “diffusion constant” is different.
(The values of the constants C#2 , C
#
3 , and C
#
4 , corresponding to d = 2, 3, 4, are determined in Section 4.4.)
For d ≥ 5 we do not know whether indifference is achievable. As a result, for d ≥ 5 our method only gives
upper and lower bounds for the investor’s worst-case final-time regret. Both bounds involve PDE’s of the
form (2.26) with suitable “diffusion constants.” The arguments are largely parallel to those sketched in this
section for d = 1. To find a good strategy for the investor, we choose the parameters f#m to minimize the
rate at which regret accumulates for the most dangerous cycle. To find a good strategy for the market, we
choose the parameters f#m to maximize the rate at which regret accumulates for the cycle most favorable to
the investor. The optimal choices of f#m are determined by a pair of linear programs, presented in Section 4.
One might have expected these linear programs to be dual, but they are not; Section 4.3 explains why not.
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2.5 Properties of u required for our analysis
The heuristic arguments in Section 2.4 rely heavily on Taylor expansion, and so do our proofs. Therefore
we need that our PDE has a solution u(t, ξ, η) that is sufficiently smooth, in the sense that
u has continuous, uniformly bounded derivatives in (ξ, η) of order up to 4,
ut has continuous, uniformly bounded derivatives in (ξ, η) of order up to 2, and
utt is continuous and uniformly bounded,
(2.28)
all bounds being uniform as t ↑ T . Our setup also has some additional requirements: it requires that
uη > c > 0 (2.29)
(with a lower bound c that is uniform in space and valid for all times between t and T ), and
|uξ| ≤ uη. (2.30)
In Section 5 we shall also need
ut ≤ 0. (2.31)
The relevance of (2.29) is clear, since many of the expressions that emerged from our heuristic discussion
had uη in the denominator. To explain the relevance of (2.30), we recall that ξ = x1 − x2 and η = x1 + x2,
where (x1, x2) are the investor’s regrets with respect to the two experts. By chain rule, ux1 = uξ + uη and
ux2 = −uξ +uη; so (2.30) is equivalent to ux1 ≥ 0 and ux2 ≥ 0. These conditions are quite intuitive: since
regret accumulates as the game proceeds, starting at time t with more regret should mean ending at time T
with more regret. They are also necessary for our heuristic calculation to make sense. Indeed, recall from
(2.16) that if the investor is in state m at time t, her choice takes the form ft,m = f∗t,m + εf
#
t,m, where f
∗
t,m
is given by (2.17). Rewriting the formula for f∗t,m in terms of ux1 and ux2 instead of uξ and uη, one finds
that
f∗t,m = q(m)
ux1
ux1 + ux2
+ r(m)
ux2
ux1 + ux2
. (2.32)
Since ux1 and ux2 are nonnegative (and their sum is strictly positive, by (2.29)), f
∗
t,m is a weighted average of
the experts’ choices q(m) and r(m). The rules of the game require that |ft,m| ≤ 1. Since ft,m = f∗t,m+εf#t,m
and we don’t know the sign of f#t,m in advance, we need |f∗t,m| < 1. This is assured by (2.32), together with
our hypothesis (2.2)) that |q(m)| < 1 and |r(m)| < 1 for every state m.
Condition (2.31) reflects again the idea that regret accumulates as the game proceeds. If we start the
game a little later (with the same initial regrets, and the same final time T ) then the total time that the game
runs is smaller, so the final-time regret should be smaller. Thus u(t, ξ, η) should be a decreasing function of
t when ξ and η are held fixed.
These conditions on u are effectively conditions on the final-time data ϕ. As already noted in the
Introduction, it is very natural to focus on final-time data of the form
ϕ(ξ, η) = cη + ϕ(ξ). (2.33)
Then the PDE
ut +
1
2
C〈D2u∇
⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉 = 0 (2.34)
with u = ϕ at t = T is solved by u = cη + u(t, ξ), where
ut +
1
2
Cuξξ = 0 for t < T , with u = ϕ at t = T . (2.35)
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(We do not need to discuss in what class the solution of (2.34) is unique, since our verification arguments
rely on the smoothness of u, not its uniqueness.) By standard results about the linear heat equation, u has the
required properties provided that ϕ has uniformly bounded third derivatives, |ϕξ| ≤ c for all ξ, and ϕξξ ≥ 0.
Interestingly, our PDE can be reduced to the linear heat equation for a much more general class of final-
time data. We first learned this from Y. Giga. The reduction was studied in detail by Kangping Zhu in [23],
and it is reviewed in an appendix to this paper. In particular, we show in the Appendix that our PDE (2.34)
with final data ϕ has a solution satisfying (2.28)–(2.31) provided
ϕ is C4 with uniformly bounded derivatives of order up to 4, (2.36)
ϕη > c > 0 for some constant c, (2.37)
|ϕξ| ≤ ϕη, and (2.38)
ϕξξϕ
2
η − 2ϕξηϕξϕη + ϕηηϕ2ξ ≥ 0. (2.39)
For machine learning, we are especially interested in the final-time data ϕ(ξ, η) = 12(η + |ξ|) =
max{x1, x2}. This has the form (2.33) with ϕ = |ξ|/2, so u is determined by solving the linear heat
equation (2.35) with final-time data |ξ|/2. Evidently u is not uniformly C4, since its second derivatives with
respect to ξ blow up at t = T . Our method can still be applied, however, by bounding this ϕ above or below
by a smooth function and considering the associated u.
2.6 Summary of our main results
In Section 2.4 we argued heuristically that our scaled value function uε is related, in the limit ε → 0, to
the solution of a PDE. The rest of this paper is devoted to proving rigorous results of this type. Careful
statements will be found in the subsequent sections, but here is a brief summary:
• In our heuristic discussion, we eventually focused on the special case d = 1, when the experts’
predictions depend only on the most recent market move. Our rigorous analysis also begins with
this case, since it permits us to address the essential issues in a relatively uncluttered environment.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 assume that the solution u of our heuristic PDE (2.26) satisfies (2.28)–(2.30).
They provide upper and lower bounds on uε, which taken together show that |uε−u| ≤ C[(T−t)+ε]ε.
While the classic case ϕ(ξ, η) = 12(η + |ξ|) is not covered by Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, the additional
ideas needed to handle it were already present in [23]; Theorem 3.3 uses them to show that for this
classic case (and still assuming d = 1) we have |uε − u| ≤ Cε| log ε|.
• In our heuristic discussion, the predictor’s strategy had the form fm = f∗m + εf#m (see e.g. (2.16)).
The value of f∗m was immediately clear, but the value of f
#
m required more thought. In Section 2.4 we
argued that the best choice of f#m was the one that made the investor indifferent between the simple
cycles of the relevant graph. For general d we do not know whether there exists such a choice of f#m .
But every choice of f#m represents a candidate strategy for the investor, and there is a linear program
that identifies the best. Our strategies for the market have a similar character: the market “forces”
the investor to make a particular choice of f#m (by penalizing her if she doesn’t), and there is a linear
program that identifies the market’s best choice. These linear programs are discussed in Section 4. For
general d we do not have explicit solutions of the linear programs, and we do not know whether their
optimal values match. Our understanding is, however, more complete for d = 2, 3, 4; we shall show
in Section 4.4 that these cases are like d = 1: there is a choice of f#m that achieves indifference. This
choice is an explicit solution to both linear programs, and it demonstrates that their optimal values
match.
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• Theorems 5.2 and 5.5 show that any admissible choice for the investor’s linear program determines a
PDE-based upper bound for uε, and any admissible choice for the market’s linear program determines
a PDE-based lower bound for uε. When the two linear programs have the same optimal value (which
happens at least for d = 2, 3, 4) we obtain an estimate of the form |uε−u| ≤ C[(T − t)+ε]ε, entirely
analogous to the situation for d = 1. For the classic final-time data ϕ = 12(η + |ξ|) similar estimates
hold, except that (as for d = 1) the error is of order ε| log ε|. (This is the assertion of Theorem 5.8.)
Throughout this paper there are only two history-dependent experts. Subsequent to this work, the first
author and J. Calder have studied the more general case of n history-dependent experts [4], using methods
quite different from those of the present work. That paper identifies u = limε→0 uε for any number of
experts n and any finite d. However, when the present work succeeds in determining u – specifically, when
n = 2 and d ≤ 4 – our approach gives a better convergence rate (ε for smooth data and ε| log ε| for the
classic case, whereas the rate obtained in [4] is ε1/3 and ε1/3| log ε|).
3 Upper and lower bounds for d = 1
This section provides a fully rigorous treatment of the special case d = 1, when the experts’ advice depends
only on the most recent stock move. The upper bound is proved by considering a good strategy for the
investor – namely, the one developed in Section 2.4. The lower bound is proved by considering a good
strategy for the market – namely, the one described at the beginning of Section 3.2.
3.1 The upper bound, when ϕ is regular
We assume throughout this section that d = 1. Let uε(t,m, ξ, η) be defined by the dynamic programming
principle (2.9) with final value uε(T,m, ξ, η) = ϕ(ξ, η) (it is defined only for times t such that (T − t)/ε2
is an integer). Let u(t, ξ, η) be the solution of the PDE
ut +
1
2
C#1 〈D2u
∇⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉 = 0,
u(T, ξ, η) = ϕ(ξ, η),
(3.1)
where
C#1 =
(q(1)− r(1))2 + (q(0)− r(0))2
2
. (3.2)
Our goal is to prove
Theorem 3.1. Suppose d = 1 and assume the PDE solution u satisfies (2.28)–(2.30). Then there is a
constant C (independent of ε, t, and T ) such that
uε(t,m, ξ, η) ≤ u(t, ξ, η) + C[(T − t) + ε]ε for t < T , ξ ∈ R, η ∈ R, and m ∈ {0, 1} (3.3)
whenever ε is small enough and t is such that N = (T − t)/ε2 is an integer.
Proof. An outline of the proof is as follows: to estimate uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0), we shall define a sequence
(tk,mk, ξk, ηk) along which uε is monotone
uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) ≤ uε(t1,m1, ξ1, η1) ≤ · · · ≤ uε(tN ,mN , ξN , ηN )
with tN = T , so that
uε(tN ,mN , ξN , ηN ) = ϕ(ξN , ηN ) = u(tN , ξN , ηN ).
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Then we’ll show that u is nearly constant along the sequence:
|u(t0, ξ0, η0)− u(tN , ξN , ηN )| ≤ C[(T − t) + ε]ε. (3.4)
These estimates lead immediately to (3.3).
To define the sequence (tk,mk, ξk, ηk), it suffices to explain the choice of (t1,m1, ξ1, η1) (then the rest
of the sequence is determined similarly, step by step). Recall the dynamic programming principle (2.9),
which we can write more compactly by defining, in terms of the investor’s choice f ,
v =
(
v1
v2
)
=
(
q(m)− r(m)
q(m) + r(m)− 2f
)
. (3.5)
The dynamic programming principle then says
uε(t,m, ξ, η) = min
|f |≤1
max
bt=±1
uε(t+ ε2,mbt , ξ + εbtv
1, η + εbtv
2). (3.6)
It follows that for any choice of f ,
uε(t,m, ξ, η) ≤ max
bt=±1
uε(t+ ε2,mbt , ξ + εbtv
1, η + εbtv
2). (3.7)
Applying this with (t,m, ξ, η) = (t0,m0, ξ0, η0) and taking b0 to achieve the max on the RHS, we see
that for t1 = t0 + ε2, m1 = (m0)b0 , ξ1 = ξ0 + εb0v
1, η1 = η0 + εb0v2 we have the desired inequality
uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) ≤ uε(t1,m1, ξ1, η1). While the preceding argument works for any choice of f , we must
make a special choice if we want the solution of the PDE to be nearly constant along the sequence. We
therefore choose f as indicated by the heuristic discussion in Section 2.4:
ft0,1 = f
∗
t0,1 + εf
#
t0,1
ft0,0 = f
∗
t0,0 + εf
#
t0,0
f∗t0,m =
(q(m)− r(m))uξ + (q(m) + r(m))uη
2uη
f#t0,1 = f
#
t0,0
=
(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2
4uη
D.
(3.8)
with the familiar convention that
D =
1
2
〈D2u · ∇
⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉, (3.9)
and the understanding that uη, uξ, and D are evaluated at (t0, ξ0, η0). As we explained in Section 2.5, this
choice of f is admissible (i.e. |f | ≤ 1) if ε is sufficiently small. (This is our only smallness condition on
ε.) In summary: given (t0,m0, ξ0, η0), the point (t1,m1, ξ1, η1) is the location that shows up on the RHS of
the dynamic programming principle when f is chosen by (3.8) and b0 achieves the max over b0 = ±1. The
rest of the sequence (tk,mk, ξk, ηk) is determined similarly, step by step. (The values of D, f∗m, b, and f
#
m
at step k will be called Dk, f∗k,m, bk, and f
#
k,m.)
Our remaining task is to prove the near-constancy of u along our sequence, (3.4). We begin by estimating
the increments
Uk := u(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1)− u(tk, ξk, ηk).
There are four cases, depending on the values of mk and bk.
Case 1: mk = 0, bk = −1.
This case is relatively easy, since the market is effectively following one of the cycles in the d = 1 graph
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(namely, the cycle 0 − 0). Taylor expanding u around (tk, ξk, ηk) as we did in (2.12), the calculation in
Section 2.4 shows that
Uk = ε
2
[
ut + (q(0)− r(0))2Dk − 2(−1)uηf#k,0
]
+O(ε3)
= ε2L(tk, 0,−1, ξk, ηk, f#k,0) +O(ε3)
where for the second line we used the definition ofL, (2.22) (which reduces in this case to (2.23)). Moreover,
the value of L(tk, 0,−1, ξk, ηk, f#tk,0) is exactly ut +C
#
1 Dk by (2.25), which equals zero by the PDE (3.1).
Thus, in case 1 we have
Uk = O(ε
3).
Case 2: mk = 1, bk = 1.
This case is similar to the first, since the market is effectively following another cycle in the d = 1 graph
(namely, the cycle 1− 1). Arguing as in Case 1, we get
Uk = ε
2
[
ut + (q(1)− r(1))2Dk − 2(+1)uηf#k,1
]
+O(ε3)
= ε2L(tk, 1, 1, ξk, ηk, f
#
k,1) +O(ε
3)
= O(ε3).
Case 3: mk = 0, bk = 1.
This case is different, since the market is doing just half of the two-step cycle 0 − 1 − 0. Starting as in the
previous cases, we have
Uk = ε
2
[
ut + (q(0)− r(0))2Dk − 2(+1)uηf#k,0
]
+O(ε3)
= ε2L(tk, 0, 1, ξk, ηk, f
#
k,0) +O(ε
3).
However the value of L in this case is no longer 0. Rather, it is
ut + (q(0)− r(0))2Dk − 2uηf#k,0 = ut + (q(0)− r(0))2Dk −
1
2
[
(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2]Dk
= ut +
1
2
[
(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2]Dk + [(q(0)− r(0))2 − (q(1)− r(1))2]Dk.
The sum of the first two terms on the right vanishes, as a consequence of the PDE; therefore
Uk = ε
2
[
(q(0)− r(0))2 − (q(1)− r(1))2]Dk +O(ε3).
Case 4: mk = 1, bk = −1.
This case is similar to the last one, since the market is again doing just half of the two-step cycle 0− 1− 0.
We have
Uk = ε
2(ut + (q(1)− r(1))2Dk − 2(−1)uηf#k,1 +O(ε3)
= ε2L(tk, 1,−1, ξk, ηk, f#k,1) +O(ε3)
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and the value of L this time is
ut + (q(1)− r(1))2Dk + 2uηf#k,1 = ut + (q(1)− r(1))2Dk +
1
2
[
(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2]Dk
= ut +
1
2
[
(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2]Dk + [(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2]Dk.
The sum of the first two terms on the right vanishes as before, so
Uk = ε
2
[
(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2]Dk +O(ε3).
(Notice that the ε2 terms from cases 3 and 4 sum to zero. This had to be so, since we know from Section 2.4
that the average value of L over the cycle 0− 1− 0 is ut + C#1 Dk, which equals 0.)
We want to show that |U0 + . . . UN−1| ≤ C[(T − t) + ε]ε. The O(ε3) terms in the estimates for Uk are
consistent with this: since there are N = (T − t)/ε2 of them, they accumulate at worst to an error that’s
bounded by C(T − t)ε. So our task is to control the sum of the order-ε2 terms from Cases 3 and 4. If the
value of Dk didn’t change with k this would be easy; but alas, it does change with k, since Dk is the value
of (3.9) evaluated at (tk, ξk, ηk).
Consider the walk on the d = 1 graph that’s associated with our sequence. Suppose transitions from
1 to 0 happen at steps i1 < i2 < . . . and transitions from 0 to 1 happen at steps j1 < j2 < . . . . These
transitions must – by their essential character – be ordered. Making a choice which comes first, we may
assume (without loss of generality) that i1 < j1. Depending upon which type of transition comes last, the
full list of transtions between 0 and 1 is either of the form
i1 < j1 < i2 < j2 < . . . iK < jK (3.10)
or
i1 < j1 < i2 < j2 < . . . iK < jK < iK+1. (3.11)
Either way, we have
K∑
n=1
(jn − in) ≤ N. (3.12)
If (3.10) holds, then the sum of the ε2 terms (in our estimates for Uk) is precisely
ε2
[
(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2] K∑
n=1
(Din −Djn). (3.13)
Now, Din andDjn represent the same function (3.9) evaluated at different points in space-time, which differ
in time by (jn − in)ε2 and in space by at most a constant times (jn − in)ε. Our hypotheses on u assure that
the expression being evaluated has uniformly bounded derivatives with respect to t, ξ, and η, so it is globally
Lipschitz continuous. We conclude that
|Din −Djn | ≤ C(jn − in)ε. (3.14)
Combining this with (3.12) gives
ε2
K∑
n=1
|Din −Djn | ≤ CNε3 = C(T − t)ε.
So by (3.13), the ε2 terms in our estimates for Uk sum to at most a constant times (T − t)ε.
If the situation is (3.11) rather than (3.10), the the same argument applies, but the ε2 term in UiK+1 must
be handled separately. In this case the ε2 terms in our estimates for Uk sum to at most a constant times
(T − t)ε+ ε2.
In either situation, these estimates establish (3.4) , completing the proof of the theorem.
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3.2 The lower bound, when ϕ is regular
Our lower bound shows that Theorem 3.1 is asymptotically sharp. Its proof is largely parallel to that of the
upper bound, except that this time we use a good strategy for the market. To describe the strategy, recall that
our heuristic discussion used Taylor expansion to estimate the increments of u. As we observed just after
(2.12), the investor must make the “first-order term” εA nearly vanish, since otherwise this term dominates
and the market can choose b to make it positive; this determined f∗m, the leading-order term in the investor’s
strategy. A more subtle analysis led us to guess the optimal next-order term, and the resulting strategy
fm = f
∗
m + εf
#
m was at the heart of our upper bound.
Our strategy for the market reflects the two-step character of the heuristic discussion:
Case 1: If the investor’s choice doesn’t nearly zero out the “first-order term,” then the market chooses b to
make that term positive; more quantitatively,
if the investor’s choice f has |f − f∗m| ≥ γε then the market chooses b so that −b(f − f∗m) ≥ 0. (3.15)
Case 2: When case 1 doesn’t apply, it is convenient to express the investor’s choice f as f = f∗m+εf
#
m+εX
(this relation defines X). The investor is more optimistic than our conjectured optimal strategy if X > 0,
and more pessimistic if X < 0. In the former case the market makes the stock go down, and in the latter
case it makes the stock go up – in each case giving the investor an unwelcome surprise; more quantitatively:
if the investor’s choice f has |f − f∗m| < γε then the market chooses b so that −bX ≥ 0. (3.16)
Here γ is a constant, which cannot be too small; specifically, it must satisfy (3.24) and (3.25) below. This
strategy lies at the heart of the following lower bound.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose d = 1, let uε be defined by the dynamic programming principle (2.9) with final-time
condition ϕ, let u solve the PDE (3.1) with the same final-time condition, and assume u satisfies (2.28)–
(2.30). Then there is a constant C (independent of ε, t, and T ) such that
uε(t,m, ξ, η) ≥ u(t, ξ, η)− C[(T − t) + ε]ε for t < T , ξ ∈ R, η ∈ R, and m ∈ {0, 1} (3.17)
whenever ε is small enough and t is such that N = (T − t)/ε2 is an integer.
Proof. For the upper bound, we estimated uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) by choosing a sequence (tk,mk, ξk, ηk) along
which uε was increasing and u was nearly constant. For the lower bound, we shall use a different sequence
along which uε is decreasing
uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) ≥ uε(t1,m1, ξ1, η1) ≥ · · · ≥ uε(tN ,mN , ξN , ηN ) (3.18)
with tN = T , so that
uε(tN ,mN , ξN , ηN ) = ϕ(ξN , ηN ) = u(tN , ξN , ηN ). (3.19)
The sequence will be chosen so that
u(tN , ξN , ηN )− u(t0, ξ0, η0) ≥ −C[(T − t) + ε]ε. (3.20)
These estimates lead immediately to (3.17).
We shall identify the sequence by explaining the choice of (t1,m1, ξ1, η1) (the rest of the sequence is
then determined similarly, step by step). Recall our compact form of the dynamic programming principle,
equation (3.6). Let f be the investor’s optimal choice at (t0,m0, ξ0, η0); then the dynamic programming
principle becomes
uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) = max
b=±1
uε(t0 + ε
2, (m0)b, ξ0 + εbv
1, η0 + εbv
2) (3.21)
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where v1 and v2 are defined by (3.5). Evidently, either choice b = 1 or b = −1 gives a point t1 =
t0 + ε
2, m1 = (m0)b, ξ1 = ξ0 + εv1, η1 = η0 + εv2 for which the desired inequality uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) ≥
uε(t1,m1, ξ1, η1) holds. We shall show that if b is chosen according to the proposed strategy (3.15)–(3.16)
then we obtain the desired control on u.
We suppose henceforth that the sequence (tk,mk, ξk, ηk) has been chosen by applying the preceding ar-
gument inductively (using the proposed market strategy to determine the value of bk at each step). Properties
(3.18) and (3.19) are immediately clear. Our plan for demonstrating (3.20) is to show that the increments
Uk = u(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1)− u(tk, ξk, ηk) satisfy
Uk ≥ ε2
[
ut + (q(mk)− r(mk))2Dk − 2bkuηf#tk,mk
]
+O(ε3). (3.22)
Crucially: the RHS of (3.22) is the expression we found for the increment in our proof of the upper bound.
Given (3.22), the rest is easy: the desired control on u, (3.20), follows immediately from the argument
we used for the upper bound (applied, of course, to the walk determined by our sequence (tk,mk, ξk, ηk)).
To prepare for the proof of (3.22), we state now the conditions we need for the constant γ (recall that
Case 1 of the market’s strategy applies when |f − f∗m| ≤ γε). Remember (from Cases 1–4 in the proof of
the upper bound) that the ε2 term on the RHS of (3.22) is either 0 or else
±ε2[(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2]Dk. (3.23)
The expression in brackets is a fixed constant. Since we have a uniform bound on |Dk| and a positive lower
bound on uη (by our hypotheses on u), by taking γ sufficiently large we can have
γ ≥ ∣∣(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2∣∣ max
ξ,η∈R2, t<T
|D|
uη
(3.24)
where D is defined as usual by (3.9). Next, recall from our heuristic discussion that when estimating the
RHS of our dynamic programming principle (3.6) by Taylor expansion, the second-order-term is
ε2
[
ut +
1
2
〈D2u · vk, vk〉
]
where vk is defined by (3.5). Since the investor must choose |f | ≤ 1, we have a uniform bound |vk| ≤ M .
Since we are assuming uniform bounds for ut and D2u (and recalling that uη is bounded away from 0) by
taking γ sufficiently large we can have
γ ≥ max
ξ,η∈R2, t<T
|v|≤M
∣∣ut + 12〈D2u · v, v〉∣∣
uη
. (3.25)
These are the only conditions we place on γ.
We now prove (3.22) for the market’s Case 1. At step k (when the current state is mk) this means the
investor’s choice fk has |fk − f∗k,mk | ≥ γε. (Here we write fk and f∗k,mk rather than ftk and f∗tk,mk to
simplify the notation.) Proceeding as we did in the heuristic discussion, the increment is
Uk = εA+ ε
2B +O(ε3) (3.26)
with
A = bk(v
1uξ + v
2uη) = bk
(
[q(mk)− r(mk)]uξ + [q(mk) + r(mk)− 2fk]uη
)
and
B = ut +
1
2
〈D2u · vk, vk〉.
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Since A is an affine function of fk and it vanishes when fk = f∗k,mk , the expression for A simplifies to
A = −2bkuη(fk − f∗k,mk). (3.27)
Since we are in Case 1, the market chooses bk so that A is positive, and we have
εA ≥ ε2[2γuη].
Since B ≤ γuη by (3.25), we have
εA+ ε2B ≥ ε2[γuη].
Making use now of (3.24), we conclude that
ε2[γuη] ≥ ε2
∣∣(q(1)− r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2∣∣Dk;
in view of (3.23), this implies the desired estimate (3.22).
Turning now to the market’s Case 2, we start again with (3.26). The value of A is again given by (3.27).
Writing fk − f∗k,mk = εf
#
k,mk
+ εX and choosing bk by the market’s strategy (3.16), we have
εA ≥ ε2[−2bkuηf#k,mk ].
Since |fk − f∗k,mk | ≤ γε, the “second-order term” B = ut + 12〈D2u · vk, vk〉 can be estimated as we did in
the heuristic calculation: replacing fk by f∗k,mk in the expression for vk makes an error of order ε, and this
leads to
ε2B = ε2[ut + (q(m)− r(m))2Dk] +O(ε3).
Adding, we conclude that
Uk = εA+ ε
2B +O(ε3)
≥ ε2[ut + (q(m)− r(m))2Dk − 2bkuηf#k,mk]+O(ε3),
which is precisely (3.22). The proof of the theorem is now complete.
3.3 The classic case, when ϕ = (η + |ξ|)/2
The classic goal of minimizing regret with respect to the best-performing expert corresponds, as we ex-
plained in Section 2.3, to using final-time data ϕ = (η + |ξ|)/2. Since this ϕ is not C3, the solution of the
associated PDE does not admit a uniform C3 bound up to t = T , so Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 do not include
this case. However we can obtain similar estimates (with an error estimate of order ε| log ε| rather than ε)
by repeating the proofs of those theorems with proper attention to the error terms. A result of this type was
proved by Zhu for two constant experts [23]; the proof of the following theorem uses essentially the same
arguments.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose d = 1 and consider the classic final-time data ϕ = (η + |ξ|)/2. We consider,
as usual, the function uε(t,m, ξ, η) defined by the dynamic programming principle (2.9) with final-time
data ϕ, and the function u(t, ξ, η) defined by the PDE (3.1) with final-time data ϕ. There is a constant C
(independent of ε, t, and T ) such that∣∣uε(t,m, ξ, η)− u(t, ξ, η)∣∣ ≤ Cε| log ε| for t < T , ξ ∈ R, η ∈ R, and m ∈ {0, 1} (3.28)
whenever ε is small enough and t is such that N = (T − t)/ε2 is an integer.
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Proof. As we observed in Section 2.5, the PDE simplifies dramatically in this case, and the solution is
u(t, ξ, η) = 12η+u(t, ξ) where u solves the linear heat equation ut +
1
2C
#
1 uξξ = 0 for t < T with u =
1
2 |ξ|
at t = T . We note that the “diffusion constant” 12C
#
1 (which is determined by (2.27)) is nonzero, since
we assumed in (2.1) that the experts were distinct. Using the explicit solution formula for the linear heat
equation we have
|∂kξ ∂ltu| ≤ Ck,l(T − t)−(k+2l−1)/2 for k ≥ 0 and l ≥ 0 with k + 2l ≥ 1. (3.29)
Our overall strategy is to repeat the arguments used for Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, with u(t, ξ, η) replaced
by the smooth function u˜(t, ξ, η) = u(t− δ, ξ, η) (which satisfies the same PDE, with final-time data that’s
a smooth approximation to ϕ). We will choose the value of δ below to optimize the resulting estimate.
To see what emerges from this strategy, we need to revisit the various “error terms” that entered the
proofs of the theorems, namely:
(i) those incurred by estimating the increments of u using Taylor expansion, i.e. the O(ε3) term in the
estimate
u(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1)− u(tk, ξk, ηk) = εA+ ε2B +O(ε3)
where A and B are given by (2.13) and (2.14) evaluated at step k;
(ii) those made by evaluating B at f∗tk,mk rather than ftk,mk , i.e. the O(ε
3) term in (2.18);
(iii) our estimate (3.14) for |Din −Djn |; and
(iv) our estimate for the value ofDK+1, which was needed when analyzing a walk with a different number
of transitions from 0 to 1 vs 1 to 0 (i.e. when (3.11) applies).
We also need to monitor errors associated with
(v) the difference |u(t− δ, ξ, η)− u(t, ξ, η)|, evaluated both at the time t that enters the estimate, and at
the final time T when u(T, ξ, η) = ϕ(ξ, η).
We begin with some easy estimates, which are too crude to give (3.28) but already give a nontrivial result.
For any δ > 0 we have uniform bounds on the derivatives of u˜(t, ξ, η) = u(t− δ, ξ, η) for t < T , obtained
by taking (T − t) = δ in (3.29). Applying this:
(i) The errors of type (i) are most easily estimated by writing the increment u(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1) −
u(tk, ξk, ηk) as
[u(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1)− u(tk+1, ξk, ηk)] + [u(tk+1, ξk, ηk)− u(tk, ξk, ηk)],
then estimating each term separately using Taylor’s theorem. If δ−1ε2 ≤ 1/2, the error due to esti-
mating a single increment by Taylor expansion is of order δ−1ε3. There are N = (T − t)/ε2 such
increments, so these accumulate to a term of order δ−1(T − t)ε.
(ii) Since the spatial second derivatives of u˜ are at most of order δ−1/2, the errors of type (ii) in the
proof of the upper bound are at most δ−1/2ε3 at each time step, accumulating to δ−1/2(T − t)ε after
summation over all steps. The situation is slightly worse in the proof of the lower bound, since in the
market’s Case 2 we only have |ft,m − f∗t,m| ≤ γε and the size of γ is controlled by (3.24)–(3.25).
These conditions can be met with γ ∼ δ−1/2; this leads to a type-(ii) error of order δ−1ε3 at each time
step, accumulating to δ−1(T − t)ε after summation over all steps.
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(iii) If δ−1ε2 ≤ 1/2 then the increment in the value of Dk from one step to the next is at most of order
δ−1ε. This gives a substitute for (3.14), namely |Din −Djn | ≤ Cδ−1ε(jn − in).
(iv) Since each Dk is at most of order δ−1/2, a single term ε2DK+1 is estimated by δ−1/2ε2.
(v) Since u(t− δ, ξ, η)−u(t, ξ, η) = ∫ tt−δ us(s, ξ, η) ds, the value at t = T is of order δ1/2, and the value
at an earlier time t is not larger.
Arguing as for Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 and using these estimates, one finds that∣∣uε(t,m, ξ, η)− u(t, ξ, η)∣∣ ≤ C(δ−1(T − t)ε+ δ−1/2ε2 + δ1/2)
provided δ−1ε2 ≤ 1/2. To make the first and last terms similar it is natural to take δ ∼ (T − t)2/3ε2/3.
(This is consistent with δ−1ε2 ≤ 1 since (T − t) ≥ ε2.) The middle term is then of order (T − t)−1/3ε5/3,
which is dominated by the other two; thus we conclude that |uε − u| ≤ C(T − t)1/3ε1/3.
The preceding estimates are too crude, because they estimate the errors at every time step using uniform
bounds for the derivatives of u˜, which are overly pessimistic when t  T . To do better, we should use
a k-dependent estimate for the errors at time tk. Since u˜(t, ξ, η) = u(t − δ, ξ, η), the derivatives of u˜ are
estimated at time tk by (3.29) with T − t replaced by T − tk + δ. For errors that accumulate over many
time steps we must sum the resulting series. This is easily done by comparison to a suitable integral: as tk
runs from t to T in increments of ε2, τk = T − tk + δ runs from T − t + δ to δ, and a sum of the form∑N
k=0 τ
−a
k ε
2 is essentially a Riemann sum for
∫ T−t+δ
δ s
−a ds; as a result we have
N∑
k=0
τ−ak ≤
{
Caε
−2δ1−a when a > 1, and
Cε−2| log δ| when a = 1. (3.30)
We now review the “error terms” from this perspective:
(i) As in the previous calculation, we write u˜(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1)− u˜(tk, ξk, ηk) as
[u˜(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1)− u˜(tk+1, ξk, ηk)] + [u˜(tk+1, ξk, ηk)− u˜(tk, ξk, ηk)].
When we estimate the first term by 2nd order Taylor expansion in space and the second by 1st order
Taylor expansion in time, we introduce an error of order
τ−1k+1ε
3 + τ
−3/2
k+1 ε
4
by (3.29). Using (3.30) and assuming δ−1ε2 ≤ 1/2, we see that these errors sum to at most a constant
times | log δ|ε+ ε.
(ii) The type-(ii) error in the upper-bound argument is controlled at step k by |u˜ξξ|ε3 ≤ τ−1/2k ε3. The
situation is slightly worse in the lower bound argument, since the constant γ in the market’s Case 2
scales like τ−1/2k at step k, leading to a type-(ii) error of order τ
−1
k ε
3. By (3.30), these errors sum to
a term of order at most | log δ|ε.
(iii) The increment in the value of Dk from one step to the next is estimated by ε2|∂tD|+ ε|∂ξD|. At step
k this is at most ε2τ−3/2k + ετ
−1
k . Using (3.30) and assuming δ
−1ε2 ≤ 1/2, we see that the sum of
these errors is at most of order | log δ|ε+ ε.
(iv) At time k, a single term ε2Dk is estimated by τ
−1/2
k ε
2. Since τk ≥ δ, when δ−1ε2 ≤ 1/2 this term is
of order ε.
22
(v) Our previous estimate of the type-(v) error remains adequate for our present purpose: it is at most
δ1/2.
Thus: both the upper-bound and lower-bound arguments, applied using u˜ rather than u, give
|uε(t,m, ξ, η)− u(t, ξ, η)| ≤ C(ε| log δ|+ ε+√δ)
provided δ−1ε2 ≤ 1/2. Choosing δ = 2ε2, we obtain the desired estimate (3.28).
We note that for the classic final-time data our estimate (3.28) is independent of time, while in Theorems
3.1 and 3.2 it was proportional to (T − t). This difference arises because for the classic final-time data, uη
is constant and all the ξ derivatives of u of order 2 or more decay to 0 as T − t → ∞ (note that uξ solves
the linear heat equation with final time data 12sgn ξ). In the more general setting of Theorems 3.1–3.2 the
derivatives driving the error terms are controlled, but it is not clear that they tend to 0 as T − t→∞.
4 The linear programs
We have thus far focused on experts that use only the most recent market move (the case d = 1). We
identified a strategy for the investor that makes her indifferent with respect to the cycles on the d = 1
graph (Section 2.4); then we used that strategy to prove upper and lower bounds that match at leading order
(Theorems 3.1 and 3.2).
The situation is similar for experts that use up to four recent market moves (the cases d = 2, 3, 4): there
is a strategy for the investor that achieves indifference with respect to the cycles on the relevant graph (see
Section 4.4), and it leads to upper and lower bounds that match at leading order (see Remark 5.7 in Section
5.2).
For experts that use more history (d ≥ 5) we do not know whether indifference is achievable. Our
methods still lead to upper and lower bounds, but it is no longer clear that they match at leading order. The
upper bound is associated with a strategy for the investor that minimizes the maximum rate at which regret
accumulates, among all possible cycles on the graph. The lower bound is associated with a strategy for
the market that maximizes the minimum rate at which regret accumulates, among all possible cycles on the
graph. The identification of these strategies is the focus of this section.
In the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, most of the work involved considering how the solution u of
our PDE changed along a well-chosen path (t0,m0, ξ0, η0), (t1,m1, ξ1, η1), . . . Within the special class of
strategies described by (2.16) and (2.17), we showed in Section 2.4 that the increments are
u(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1)− u(tk, ξk, ηk) = ε2L(tk,mk, bk, ξk, ηk, f#tk,mk) +O(ε3)
where
L(t,m, b, ξ, η, f#t,m) = ut + (q(m)− r(m))2D − 2buηf#t,m
(see (2.12) – (2.22)); here we use our usual convention D = 12〈D2u · ∇
⊥u
uη
, ∇
⊥u
uη
〉, and bk is determined by
the relation (mk)bk = mk+1. Since u represents our estimate of the investor’s worst-case regret, we think
of ε2L as the increment of regret.
Our linear programs are concerned with the average rate at which regret accumulates, as the state m
traverses various cycles. In formulating them, we will treat ut, D, and uη as constants, ignoring the fact that
they are functions evaluated at different points in space-time. This seems reasonable, since the state changes
at every step while the location in space-time changes slowly (by increments of order ε in space and ε2 in
time). Our rigorous bounds, presented in Section 5, will of course take into account the fact that ut, D, and
uη are not really constant.
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As an introduction to the linear programs, it is convenient to revisit the case d = 1. Its graph, shown
in Figure 2, has three cycles: 00, 11, and 010. The condition that for each cycle, the average rate at which
regret accumulates is at most ε2R is therefore
ut + (q(0)− r(0))2D + 2uηf#0 ≤ R
ut + (q(1)− r(1))2D − 2uηf#1 ≤ R
2ut + [(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2]D − 2uηf#0 + 2uηf#1 ≤ 2R.
(4.1)
The investor wants to make R as small as possible. Since ut is being treated as a constant, we can move it
to the right hand side. Setting M = (R− ut)/D and
βm =
2uη
D
f#m , (4.2)
and assuming D > 0, we see that (4.1) is equivalent to
(q(0)− r(0))2 + β0 ≤M
(q(1)− r(1))2 − β1 ≤M
[(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2]− β0 + β1 ≤ 2M.
(4.3)
(In practice, the parameter D will come from the solution of our PDE, and it is nonnegative by (2.31). We
need not be concerned about the exceptional case D = 0, which is handled in Section 5 by taking f#m = 0.)
The investor’s linear program for d = 1 is thus to find β0, β1, and M that minimize M subject to (4.3).
A similar discussion applies for the market. The condition that for each simple cycle, the average rate at
which regret accumulates is at least ε2R is
ut + (q(0)− r(0))2D + 2uηf#0 ≥ R
ut + (q(1)− r(1))2D − 2uηf#1 ≥ R
2ut + [(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2]D − 2uηf#0 + 2uηf#1 ≥ 2R.
Changing variables as before, this is equivalent to
(q(0)− r(0))2 + β0 ≥M
(q(1)− r(1))2 − β1 ≥M
[(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2]− β0 + β1 ≥ 2M.
(4.4)
The market’s linear program for d = 1 is thus to find β0, β1, and M that maximize M subject to (4.4).
The following properties of these linear programs are immediately evident:
(i) If β0, β1, and M are admissible for (4.3), then adding the constraints gives
M ≥ (q(0)− r(0))
2 + (q(1)− r(1))2
2
.
(ii) If β0, β1, and M are admissible for (4.4), then adding the constraints gives
M ≤ (q(0)− r(0))
2 + (q(1)− r(1))2
2
.
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(iii) In view of (i) and (ii), the values of the two linear programs coincide when there is a choice of β0
and β1 that achieves indifference, in the sense that the LHS of each of the inequalities in (4.3) (or
equivalently, each of the inequalities in (4.4)) takes the same value; moreover the common value is
then 12 [(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2].
(iv) The values of the two linear programs do indeed coincide, since the choice β0 = β1 = 12 [(q(1) −
r(1))2 − (q(0)− r(0))2] achieves indifference.
We shall show in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 that analogues of (i)–(iii) hold for any d. We do not know whether the
analogue of (iv) holds for any d, however we shall show in Section 4.4 that indifference is achievable when
d = 2, 3, or 4.
4.1 The investor’s linear program
The investor’s linear program for d = 1, presented above as the minimization of M subject to (4.3), can be
written as
minM such that
A
−β0−β1
M
 ≤ g (4.5)
with
A =
−1 0 −10 1 −1
1 −1 −2
 and g = −
 (q(0)− r(0))2(q(1)− r(1))2
(q(0)− r(0))2 + (q(1)− r(1))2
 .
Notice that each row of A corresponds to a simple cycle; the final entry in a row is minus the length of
the cycle, while the row’s other elements reflect the details of the cycle. As for g: each row is minus the sum
of (q(m)− r(m))2, as m ranges over the vertices participating in the associated cycle.
The investor’s linear program is similar for any value of d: it always has the form
minM such that
A

−β0
. . .
−β2d−1
M
 ≤ g (4.6)
where each row of A corresponds to a simple cycle on the underlying graph (the d-dimensional de Bruijn
graph on 2 symbols, see Section 2.2). If the graph has l simple cycles then A is an l × (2d + 1) matrix. Its
first 2d columns are in correspondence with the vertices: for 0 ≤ m ≤ 2d−1, the (m+1)th column reports,
for each cycle, whether the cycle includes vertex m, and if so then whether the cycle leaves it by a + edge
or a − edge. The last column of A is, up to sign, the number of edges in the cycle. The elements of g are,
up to sign, the sum of (q(m)− r(m))2 as m ranges over the vertices in the given cycle. More explicitly: the
first 2d columns of the matrix A are determined by
ai,m+1 = 1 if cycle i contains an edge from m to m+;
ai,m+1 = −1 if cycle i contains an edge from m to m−; (4.7)
ai,m+1 = 0 if cycle i does not pass through vertex m;
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the last column of A has entries
ai,2d+1 = −|si| where |si| is the number of edges in cycle i; (4.8)
and the elements of g are
gi = −
∑
verticesm in cycle i
(q(m)− r(m))2. (4.9)
While A happens to be square when d = 1, it is usually rectangular; for example, when d = 2 there are 6
simple cycles and 4 vertices, so A is 6× 5.
The interpretation of the investor’s linear program (4.6) is the same for any d as it was for d = 1: if βm
(0 ≤ m ≤ 2d − 1) and M are admissible then choice f#m = D2uη βm assures that the average rate at which
regret accumulates over any simple cycle is at most ε2R with R = ut +MD.
Lemma 4.1. The investor’s linear program (4.6) has the following properties:
(a) The feasible set is nonempty; moreover, every feasible point has the property that
M ≥
∑2d−1
m=0 (q(m)− r(m))2
2d
. (4.10)
(b) The optimum is achieved.
(c) If there is a strategy that achieves indifference (i.e. if there is a feasible point for which the constraints
all hold with equality) then the optimal value of the investor’s linear program is
2−d
∑2d−1
m=0 (q(m)− r(m))2.
Proof. The existence of a feasible point is easy: if we take βm = 0 for all m, then the constraints are
satisfied provided that for each cycle i,
M ≥ 1|si|
∑
verticesm in cycle i
(q(m)− r(m))2
where |si| is the number of edges in cycle i.
To complete the proof of (a) we must establish the lower bound (4.10). We use here the fact that our de
Bruijn graph is Eulerian, i.e. there exists a closed walk on the graph that traverses each edge exactly once
(see e.g. [22]). Consider a decomposition of this walk as a union of simple cycles. Clearly no cycle can
appear more than once; and in the union of all the cycles that are used, each vertex m appears twice – once
in connection with the edge from m to m+, and once in connection with the edge from m to m−. When
we add the constraints corresponding the cycles that are used, the terms involving βm cancel (since each βm
appears twice, with opposite signs – once due to the edge from m to m+, and once due to the edge from m
to m−). The sum of these constraints thus reduces to
2
2d−1∑
m=0
(q(m)− r(m))2 ≤ 2d+1M,
which is equivalent to (4.10).
Assertion (b) follows immediately from (a), using the general result from linear programming that if
an LP of the form (4.6) is feasible and bounded below then the optimal value is achieved. Alternatively
(and more constructively), one can see (b) by considering the simplex method (with a suitable scheme to
prevent cycling). At each step the simplex method moves in a direction that improves the objective. A move
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to infinity cannot occur, since the objective is bounded below. Therefore the simplex method moves from
vertex to vertex, terminating at one that is optimal.
Assertion (c) is clear from the proof of (4.10). Indeed, we proved that result by adding the inequalities
associated with the cycles of an Eulerian circuit. A strategy that achieves indifference turns those inequalities
into equalities, so equality must also hold in (4.10).
4.2 The market’s linear program
Comparing (4.3) and (4.4), we see that for d = 1 the market’s linear program is obtained from the investor’s
by changing the direction of the inequalities and changing the objective from minM to maxM . The
situation is the same for any d: the market’s linear program is
maxM such that
A

−β0
. . .
−β2d−1
M
 ≥ g (4.11)
where A and g are still defined by (4.7)–(4.9). Its interpretation is analogous to the case d = 1: if βm
(0 ≤ m ≤ 2d − 1) and M are admissible for (4.11) then the choice f#m = D2uη βm assures that the average
rate at which regret accumulates over any simple cycle is at least ε2R with R = ut +MD.
The following analogue of Lemma 4.1 is proved using the same arguments.
Lemma 4.2. The market’s linear program (4.11) has the following properties:
(a) The feasible set is nonempty; moreover, every feasible point has the property that
M ≤
∑2d−1
m=0 (q(m)− r(m))2
2d
. (4.12)
(b) The optimum is achieved.
(c) If there is a strategy that achieves indifference (i.e. if there is a feasible point for which the constraints
all hold with equality) then the optimal value of the market’s linear program is
2−d
∑2d−1
m=0 (q(m)− r(m))2.
Corollary 4.3. The optimal value of the market’s linear program is less than or equal to that of the investor’s
linear program. If there is a strategy that achieves indifference then the optimal values are equal.
Proof. The first assertion is clear by combining part (a) of Lemma 4.1 with part (a) of Lemma 4.2. The
second assertion follows from part (c) of each Lemma.
4.3 Why are the LP’s not convex duals?
In finite dimensions, zero-sum two-person games using mixed strategies can be analyzed using the duality
theory of linear programming, leading to a pair of dual linear programs – one for the “minimizing” player,
the other for the “maximizing” player. We emphasize that this is not the relationship between our linear
programs (4.6) and (4.11).
It is natural to ask whether duality might somehow be relevant to our problem. The answer is this:
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(a) If the rules of the game required the investor to choose fm = f∗m+εf
#
m , as envisioned by the heuristic
argument presented in Section 2.4, then duality would be relevant (at least formally). Indeed, as we
shall show in a moment, the dual of the investor’s linear program provides a convex combination of
simple cycles that makes the market indifferent to the investor’s choice of f#m and provides (at least
formally) a lower bound that matches our upper bound.
(b) Alas, the rules of our game do not require the investor to behave this way (and we have not proved
that the optimal choice has this form). In our lower bound for d ≥ 2, presented in Section 5, the idea
of the proof is similar to what we did in Section 3.2 for d = 1. The market considers a particular
investor strategy of the form fm = f∗m + εf
#
m , and chooses the stock movement b = ±1 based on the
sign of fˆ − fm, where fˆ is the investor’s choice. Roughly speaking, the market uses his discretion
over the stock price evolution to “force” the investor to use the particular strategy (much as we did
for d = 1 in (3.15)–(3.16)). In doing so, the market loses all control over the cycle decomposition
of the resulting walk; therefore his worst-case estimate involves the minimum rate at which regret
accumulates (the minimization being over all simple cycles). Our market’s linear program, which
chooses f#m to maximize this, seems quite different from the dual of the investor’s linear program.
The rest of this subsection explains point (a). The investor’s linear program chooses f#m to
min
f#m
max
cycles
(average rate at which regret accumulates).
Normalizing as we did in Section 4.1, and indexing the simple cycles by i = 1, . . . , n, this amounts to
min
βm
max
1≤i≤n
1
|si|
∑
verticesm
on cycle i
[(q(m)− r(m))2 − bi,mβm] (4.13)
where |si| is the number of edges in cycle i, and bi,m = +1 if cycle i leaves vertex m by the edge from
m to m+, while bi,m = −1 if cycle i leaves vertex m by the edge from m to m−. (Note that bi,m =
ai,m+1, according to (4.7).) The inner max is not changed if we permit “mixed strategies,” i.e. a probability
distribution over the possible cycles. So the investor’s linear program solves
min
βm
max
p1+···+pn=1
pi≥0
n∑
i=1
pi
1
|si|
∑
verticesm
on cycle i
[(q(m)− r(m))2 − bi,mβm]. (4.14)
The dual is obtained by switching the min and the max, then evaluating the inner minimization. Since the
variables βm are unbounded,
min
βm
n∑
i=1
pi
1
|si|
∑
verticesm
on cycle i
[(q(m)− r(m))2 − bi,mβm] =
{ −∞ if the variables βm don’t cancel out∑n
i=1 pi
1
|si|
∑
verticesm
on cycle i
(q(m)− r(m))2 if they do. (4.15)
Thus: the dual of the investor’s linear program involves mixed strategies over the simple cycles that make
the market insensitive to the investor’s choice of βm (or equivalently, f
#
m ); the optimal mixed strategy is the
one that maximizes the value of (4.15). Since min-max equals max-min in this setting, the value achieved
by the optimal mixed strategy is the same as that of the investor’s linear program.
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Does the market have access to such mixed strategies? We suppose so, since the market can choose any
walk it likes.
As noted earlier, throughout this section we have ignored the fact that ut, uη, and D = 12〈D2u ·
∇⊥u
uη
, ∇
⊥u
uη
〉 are not really constant. Our upper and lower bounds for d ≥ 2, presented in Section 5, deal with
this issue – but only for linear programs discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. We have not attempted to address
this issue for the dual of the investor’s linear program.
4.4 Coalescence of the optimal values for d ≤ 4
Recall from Corollary 4.3 that the investor’s linear program and the market’s linear program have the same
optimal value if there is a choice of {βm}2d−1m=0 that achieves indifference. We have already shown the
existence of such a choice when d = 1. This subsection shows the existence of such a choice when d = 2,
3, or 4. Alas, since our analysis is by brute force, it offers little insight about whether indifference is also
achievable for d ≥ 5.
THE CASE d = 2. The graph for d = 2 was shown in Figure 1. It is easy to see that there are six simple
cycles, and we enumerated them in Section 2.2. Introducing the notation
γm = (q(m)− r(m))2,
indifference requires that β0, . . . , β3 satisfy
γ0 + β0 = M
γ3 − β3 = M
γ1 + γ2 + β1 − β2 = 2M
γ0 + γ1 + γ2 − β0 + β1 + β2 = 3M
γ1 + γ2 + γ3 − β1 − β2 + β3 = 3M
γ0 + γ1 + γ2 + γ3 − β0 − β1 + β2 + β3 = 4M
(4.16)
and we know the value of M from Lemma 4.1(c). Elementary manipulation reveals that indifference is
achieved when
M =
γ0 + γ1 + γ2 + γ3
4
β0 = β2 = M − γ0
β1 = β3 = γ3 −M.
THE CASE d = 3. It is straightforward to draw the d = 3 graph (see e.g. Figure 1 of [10]). It is possible
(though laborious) to check by hand that there are 19 simple cycles, and to write down the d = 3 analogue
of (4.16) (a system of 19 linear equations in the 9 unknowns γ0, . . . , γ7 and M ). Solving that system, one
finds that indifference is achieved for d = 3 when
M =
∑7
m=0 γi
8
β0 = β4 = M − γ0
β1 = β5 = −M + −γ2 + γ3 + γ6 + γ7
2
β2 = β6 = M − γ0 + γ1 + γ4 − γ5
2
β3 = β7 = γ7 −M.
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THE CASE d = 4. The d = 4 graph is not planar, but it is still not difficult to visualize (see e.g. Figure
1 of [10]). We wrote a Matlab program to enumerate the simple cycles; it found 179 of them. Using the
results, we looked numerically for linear combinations of {γm}15m=0 that achieve indifference. This led to
the conclusion that indifference is achieved for d = 4 when
M =
∑15
i=0 γi
16
β0 = β8 = M − γ0
β1 = β9 = −M + −2γ2 + 2γ3 − γ4 − γ5 + γ6 + γ7 + γ12 + γ13 + γ14 + γ15
4
β2 = β10 = M − γ0 + γ1 + γ2 + γ3 + 2γ4 − 2γ5 + γ8 + γ9 − γ10 − γ11
4
β3 = β11 = −M + −2γ6 + 2γ7 + 2γ14 + 2γ15
4
β4 = β12 = M − 2γ0 + 2γ1 + 2γ8 − 2γ9
4
β5 = β13 = −M + −γ4 − γ5 + γ6 + γ7 − 2γ10 + 2γ11 + γ12 + γ13 + γ14 + γ15
4
β6 = β14 = M − γ0 + γ1 + γ2 + γ3 + γ8 + γ9 − γ10 − γ11 + 2γ12 − 2γ13
4
β7 = β15 = −M + g15.
We wonder whether indifference might be achievable for any d. Alas, the brute force approach we have
used for d ≤ 4 does not provide much guidance. (It does, however, provide some hints; in particular, the
choices achieving indifference for d = 2, 3, 4 all have the symmetry that βm = βm+2d−1 for 0 ≤ m ≤
2d−1 − 1. This means that βm actually depends only on the most recent d− 1 market moves.)
5 Upper and lower bounds for general d
This section provides our fully rigorous upper and lower bounds for the general case, when our two experts
use d days of data. The arguments are in many ways parallel to those presented in Section 3 where we
considered the case d = 1. The main differences are:
(i) For d = 1 there is a choice of βm that achieves indifference (in the sense of Lemmas 4.1(c) and
4.2(c)), and the proofs of both the upper and lower bounds used the associated value of f#m (this was
the logic behind (3.8)). For general d, our upper bound uses the investor’s linear program to determine
f#m , whereas our lower bound uses the market’s linear program.
(ii) In formulating the linear programs at the beginning of Section 4 we ignored the fact that ut, uη, and
D = 12〈D2u · ∇
⊥u
uη
, ∇
⊥u
uη
〉 are functions of x and t. For d = 1, the errors associated with their
variability were relatively easy to control (see (3.10)–(3.14)). While that argument did not make
explicit use of the graph, it basically relied on the simple cycle structure of the d = 1 graph. The
corresponding arguments for general d are more complicated since the cycle structure of the graph is
less controlled.
In connection with the second point, we shall need the following refinement of Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 5.1. When a closed walk on a directed graph is decomposed into a union of simple cycles by the
argument used to prove Lemma 2.3, the decomposition has the following property: for any simple cycle s
that appears in the decomposition more than once, each instance of s is completed before the next begins
(as one traverses the walk from beginning to end).
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Proof. Fixing the graph under consideration, we use complete induction on the length of the walk. The
shortest possible length of a closed walk is the length of the shortest simple cycle; for walks of this length
the result is trivial.
For the inductive step, we must show that if the result is true for closed walks of length up to N − 1 then
it is also true for closed walks of length N . So consider a closed walk of length N whose vertices (in order)
are a0, a1, . . . , aN with aN = a0. Consider (as in the proof of Lemma 2.3) the beginning of the walk, up to
the first time a vertex is repeated:
a0 . . . ai . . . aj . . . aN where aj = ai is the first repetition.
Then s = ai . . . aj is a simple cycle, and it is the first cycle in the decomposition of the walk. The rest
of the decomposition is obtained by considering the walk that remains after removal of this cycle, namely
a0 . . . ai−1, aj , aj+1 . . . aN and applying the same argument (repeatedly). The inductive hypothesis applies
to this shortened walk.
For simple cycles other than s, the inductive hypotheses assures us that each instance is complete before
the next begins, as one traverses the shortened walk. Therefore the same is true of the original walk.
As for the simple cycle s: since ai = aj was the first repeated node, none of the vertices a0 . . . ai−1
participate in s. Therefore in the decomposition of the shortened walk, no instances of s are begun during
the initial segment a0 . . . ai−1. So the first instance of s is completed before the others begin; and by the
inductive hypothesis, each other instance of s is completed before the next begins.
5.1 The upper bound, when ϕ is regular
Let uε(t,m, ξ, η) be defined by the dynamic programming principle (2.9) with final value uε(T,m, ξ, η) =
ϕ(ξ, η) (it is defined only for times t such that (T − t)/ε2 is an integer); and let u(t, ξ, η) be the solution of
the PDE
ut +
1
2
C#d 〈D2u
∇⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉 = 0,
u(T, ξ, η) = ϕ(ξ, η),
(5.1)
where C#d is the optimal value of the investor’s linear program (4.6). Our goal is to prove
Theorem 5.2. Let d ≥ 1 be an integer and assume the solution u of (5.1) satisfies (2.28)–(2.31). Then there
is a constant C (independent of ε, t, and T ) such that
uε(t,m, ξ, η) ≤ u(t, ξ, η) + C[(T − t) + ε]ε for t < T , ξ ∈ R, η ∈ R, and m ∈ {0, 1}d (5.2)
whenever ε is small enough and t is such that N = (T − t)/ε2 is an integer.
Proof. Our overall strategy is the same as for Theorem 3.1: to estimate uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0), we shall define a
sequence (tk,mk, ξk, ηk) along which uε is monotone
uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) ≤ uε(t1,m1, ξ1, η1) ≤ · · · ≤ uε(tN ,mN , ξN , ηN ) (5.3)
with tN = T , so that
uε(tN ,mN , ξN , ηN ) = ϕ(ξN , ηN ) = u(tN , ξN , ηN ). (5.4)
Then we’ll show that
u(tN , ξN , ηN )− u(t0, ξ0, η0) ≤ C[(T − t0) + ε]ε. (5.5)
These estimates lead immediately to (5.2).
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Our choice of {(tk,mk, ξk, ηk)}Nk=1 is entirely parallel to what was done for Theorem 3.1. It suffices
to explain the choice of (t1,m1, ξ1, η1) (then the rest of the sequence is determined similarly, step by step).
Recall that the dynamic programming principle was written compactly in equations (3.5)–(3.6), and it gave
uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) ≤ max
b0=±1
uε(t0 + ε
2,mb0 , ξ0 + εb0v
1, η0 + εb0v
2) (5.6)
where (v1, v2) are determined by the investor’s choice of f via (3.5). Our choice of f = f∗t0,m0 + εf
#
t0,m0
is guided by the heuristic discussion in Section 2.4 (which determines f∗t0,m0) combined with the investor’s
linear program (which determines f#t0,m0 via (4.2)):
ft0,m0 = f
∗
t0,m + εf
#
t0,m0
, with
f∗t0,m0 =
(q(m0)− r(m0))uξ + (q(m0) + r(m0))uη
2uη
and
f#t0,m0 =
D
2uη
βm0 .
(5.7)
Here uξ, uη, and D = 12〈D2u · ∇
⊥u
uη
, ∇
⊥u
uη
〉 are evaluated at (t0, ξ0, η0), while βm0 comes from the solution
of the investor’s linear program (4.6). (If the linear program has more than one solution, we choose one and
use it throughout the proof.) The proper choice of (t1,m1, ξ1, η1) is now clear: taking b0 to achieve the max
on the RHS of (5.6), the choice t1 = t0 + ε2, m1 = (m0)b0 , ξ1 = ξ0 + εb0v
1, η1 = η0 + εb0v2 satisfies
the desired inequality uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) ≤ uε(t1,m1, ξ1, η1). The rest of the sequence (tk,mk, ξk, ηk) is
determined similarly, up to k = N , when tN = T .
We now depart a bit from the proof of Theorem 3.1. The sequence m0,m1, . . . ,mN is a walk on our
directed graph, but it is not in general closed (since we cannot expect that mN = m0). It can, however, be
extended to a closed walk by adding some steps at the end. Indeed, as already noted in Section 4 our graph
is Eulerian, i.e. there is a closed walk (an Eulerian circuit) that traverses each edge exactly once; the desired
extension can be achieved by adding part of an Eulerian circuit, starting from mN and stopping upon arrival
at m0. We let N ′ be the final index of the extended walk (so mN ′ = m0); note that the number of extra
steps is bounded by the total number of edges in the graph:
N ′ −N ≤ 2d+1. (5.8)
The expression uε(tk,mk, ξk, ηk) is undefined for k > N . However it is convenient to introduce a suitable
choice of (tk, ξk, ηk) for k > N , so that u(tk, ξk, ηk) will make sense. We take the time increments to be
trivial: tk = tN = T for k > N . For the spatial increments we use the same definition as for k < N :
defining bk = ±1 for k ≥ N by (mk)bk = mk+1, we set
ξk+1 = ξk + εbkv
1, ηk+1 = ηk + εbkv
2
for k ≥ N , where (v1, v2) are determined by the investor’s choice of f via (3.5), the choice of f still being
given by (5.7) (with t0 and m0 replaced by tk and mk, and with uξ, uη, and D = 12〈D2u · ∇
⊥u
uη
, ∇
⊥u
uη
〉
evaluated at (tk, ξk, ηk)). This choice has the key feature that when the increment
Uk = u(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1)− u(tk, ξk, ηk)
is estimated for k ≥ N by Taylor expansion, there is no ut term (since tk+1 = tk) and the first-order terms
involving the increments of ξ and η vanish (see (2.12)–(2.18)); as a result, we have
|Uk| ≤ Cε2 for k ≥ N. (5.9)
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As a reminder, we also have a convenient estimate for the increments at k < N :
Uk = ε
2L(tk,mk, bk, ξk, ηk, f
#
tk,mk
) +O(ε3) (5.10)
where L is defined by (2.22).
We now start the proof of (5.5). In view of (5.8) and (5.9), it suffices to prove that
u(tN ′ , ξN ′ , ηN ′)− u(t0, ξ0, η0) ≤ C[(T − t0) + ε]ε.
Since the walk m0, . . . ,mN ′ is closed, it is a union of simple cycles by Lemma 2.3. Now,
u(tN ′ , ξN ′ , ηN ′)− u(t0, ξ0, η0) =
N ′−1∑
k=0
Uk, (5.11)
and each increment is associated with a step of our closed walk, so RHS of (5.11) can be reorganized using
the walk’s cycle decomposition.
The total contribution of all cycles that involve the extended part of the walk (i.e., cycles that include a
node mk with k > N ) is of order ε2, since the number of such cycles is finite (with an estimate depending
only on d) and each instance of any cycle makes a contribution of order ε2. We shall refer to the cycles that
don’t involve the extended part of the walk as the remaining cycles.
The O(ε3) error terms in (5.10) don’t bother us, since they accumulate to an error of at most C(T − t)ε.
Thus to prove (5.5) we need only show that
the terms ε2L(tk,mk, bk, ξk, ηk, f
#
tk,mk
) coming from the
remaining cycles sum to at most C(T − t)ε. (5.12)
Let {si}ni=1 be a list of the simple cycles on the graph; we shall (as usual) write |si| for the number of edges
in si. Suppose that among the remaining cycles, si appears σi times. We sum L(tk,mk, bk, ξk, ηk, f
#
tk,mk
)
over the remaining cycles in stages: first over the edges of an instance α of a cycle si, then over the σi
instances of this cycle, then over all the distinct cycles s1, . . . , sn. Thus, the quantity to be estimated is
ε2
∑
remaining
cycles
L(tk,mk, bk, ξk, ηk, f
#
tk,mk
) = ε2
n∑
i=1
σi∑
α=1
|si|∑
j=1
L(tαi,j ,m
α
i,j , b
α
i,j , ξ
α
i,j , η
α
i,j , f
#
tαi,j ,m
α
i,j
). (5.13)
Here the time steps have been relabeled using the cycle decomposition: tαi,j is the time when instance α of
cycle si takes its jth step, j = 1, . . . , |si|. Note that by Lemma 5.1, for each i and each α < σi,
tαi,1 < t
α
i,2 < . . . < t
α
i,|si| < t
α+1
i,1 < t
α+1
i,2 < . . . < t
α+1
i,|si|. (5.14)
In formulating our linear program we treated ut, uη, etc. as being constant, whereas in fact they vary with
space and time. To deal with this, we need to compare L(tαi,j ,m
α
i,j , b
α
i,j , ξ
α
i,j , η
α
i,j , f
#
tαi,j ,m
α
i,j
) to the analogous
quantity L(tαi,1,m
α
i,j , b
α
i,j , ξ
α
i,1, η
α
i,1, f
#
tαi,1,m
α
i,j
) obtained by freezing ut, uη, etc to their values at time tαi,1 when
the αth instance of the ith cycle begins. Combining the definition (2.22) of L with the choice (5.7) of f#t,m,
we have
L(t,m, b, ξ, η, f#t,m) = ut + (q(m)− r(m))2D − bβmD,
in which ut and D = 12〈D2u · ∇
⊥u
uη
, ∇
⊥u
uη
〉 are evaluated at (t, ξ, η). Our hypotheses (2.28)–(2.29) assure
that ut and D are uniformly Lipschitz continuous functions of t, ξ, and η. Since the number of time steps
from tαi,1 to t
α
i,j is (t
α
i,j − tαi,1)/ε2 and the change in (t, ξ, η) is of order ε at each time step,
L(tαi,j ,m
α
i,j , b
α
i,j , ξ
α
i,j , η
α
i,j , f
#
tαi,j ,m
α
i,j
) = L(tαi,1,m
α
i,j , b
α
i,j , ξ
α
i,1, η
α
i,1, f
#
tαi,1,m
α
i,j
) +
tαi,j − tαi,1
ε2
O(ε). (5.15)
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Focusing on the terms associated with a particular instance of a particular cycle (thus, fixing α and i), we
conclude that
|si|∑
j=1
L(tαi,j ,m
α
i,j , b
α
i,j , ξ
α
i,j , η
α
i,j , f
#
tαi,j ,m
α
i,j
)
=
|si|∑
j=1
L(tαi,1,m
α
i,j , b
α
i,j , ξ
α
i,1, η
α
i,1, f
#
tαi,1,m
α
i,j
) +
|si|∑
j=1
ε−2(tαi,j − tαi,1)O(ε)
= |si|
ut +Dαi,1 |si|∑
j=1
1
|si|
[
(q(mαi,j)− r(mαi,j))2 − bαi,jβmαi,j
]+ |si|∑
j=1
(tαi,j − tαi,1)O(ε−1) (5.16)
where Dαi,1 is the value of
1
2〈D2u · ∇
⊥u
uη
, ∇
⊥u
uη
〉) evaluated at (tαi,1, ξαi,1, ηαi,1), and ut is also evaluated at this
location. We come now to the key point:
|si|∑
j=1
1
|si|
[
(q(mαi,j)− r(mαi,j))2 − bαi,jβmαi,j
]
≤ C#d , (5.17)
since (β0, . . . , β2d−1, C
#
d ) is a feasible point for the investor’s linear program. Our hypothesis that ut ≤ 0
and the PDE (5.1) assure that Dαi,1 ≥ 0; so (5.16) is bounded above by
|si|[ut + C
#
d
2
〈D2u∇
⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉] +
|si|∑
j=1
(tαi,j − tαi,1)O(ε−1). (5.18)
Since the first term vanishes by (5.1), we have shown that
|si|∑
j=1
L(tαi,j ,m
α
i,j , b
α
i,j , ξ
α
i,j , η
α
i,j , f
#
tαi,j ,m
α
i,j
) ≤
|si|∑
j=1
(tαi,j − tαi,1)O(ε−1) (5.19)
for every i and α.
To finish, we now sum over i and α and change the order of summation:
value of (5.13) ≤ ε2
n∑
i=1
σi∑
α=1
|si|∑
j=1
(tαi,j − tαi,1)O(ε−1) =
n∑
i=1
|si|∑
j=1
σi∑
α=1
(tαi,j − tαi,1)O(ε).
By (5.14) this is at most
n∑
i=1
|si|∑
j=1
[T − t0]O(ε).
Since n (the number of cycles) and maxi |si| (the maximum length of a cycle) are constants (depending only
on d), we conclude as desired that
value of (5.13) ≤ C(T − t0)ε,
where C depends only on d and the constants implicit in our hypotheses on u, (2.28)–(2.31).
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Remark 5.3. The only property of C#d that we used in the proof was the existence of {βm} such that
(β0, . . . , β2d−1, C
#
d ) is a feasible point for the investor’s linear program (see (5.17)). As a reminder, this
means that for each cycle s on the graph,
1
|s|
∑
verticesm
on cycle s
[(q(m)− r(m))2 − bi,mβm] ≤ C#d .
where |s| is the number of edges in s and bi,m was defined after (4.14). By choosing C#d to be the optimal
value of the investor’s linear program we make C#d as small as possible, optimizing the resulting bound. But
since our argument uses only feasibility (not optimality), any feasible point for the investor’s linear program
determines an upper bound on uε. For example, to get an upper bound that’s worse than that of Theorem
5.2 but somewhat more explicit, one can take βm = 0 for all m and replace C
#
d in (5.1) by
max
s∈{cycles}
1
|s|
∑
verticesm
on cycle s
(q(m)− r(m))2.
Remark 5.4. The hypotheses of Theorem 5.2 include that ut ≤ 0, an assumption we didn’t need when
d = 1. It was needed for the passage from (5.17) to (5.18). If there is a strategy that achieves indifference
(in the sense of Lemmas 4.1(c) and 4.2(c)) then the inequality in (5.17) becomes an equality and the sign of
ut becomes irrelevant. As a reminder: we showed in Section 4.4 that indifference is achievable for d ≤ 4.
5.2 The lower bound, when ϕ is regular
For our lower bound on uε, the function u solves a PDE similar to that used for the lower bound, but with a
different “diffusion constant”: throughout this subsection, u(t, ξ, η) is the solution of the PDE
ut +
1
2
C∗d〈D2u
∇⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉 = 0,
u(T, ξ, η) = ϕ(ξ, η),
(5.20)
where C∗d is the optimal value of the market’s linear program (4.11). Our goal is to prove
Theorem 5.5. Let d ≥ 1 be an integer, and assume the solution u of (5.20) satisfies (2.28)–(2.31). Then
there is a constant C (independent of ε, t, and T ) such that
uε(t,m, ξ, η) ≥ u(t, ξ, η)− C[(T − t) + ε]ε for t < T , ξ ∈ R, η ∈ R, and m ∈ {0, 1} (5.21)
whenever ε is small enough and t is such that N = (T − t)/ε2 is an integer.
Proof. No new ideas are needed, beyond those introduced for the lower bound when d = 1 (Theorem 3.2)
and the upper bound for general d (Theorem 5.2). Therefore we will be somewhat brief.
Our lower bound for d = 1 was associated with a specific strategy for the market, which was summarized
at the beginning of Section 3.2. Our lower bound for general d uses an analogous strategy. Briefly: the
market identifies a specific investor strategy of the form fm = f∗m + εf
#
m by solving the market’s linear
program, and chooses the market’s movements to penalize the investor if she doesn’t make that choice. In
35
more detail: the market’s strategy is organized around the analogue of (5.7) obtained using the market’s
linear program rather than the investor’s:
ft,m = f
∗
t,m + εf
#
t,m, with
f∗t,m =
(q(m)− r(m))uξ + (q(m) + r(m))uη
2uη
and
f#t,m =
D
2uη
βm.
(5.22)
where {βm}2d−1m=0 come from the solution of the market’s linear program (4.6). There are two cases, identical
to (3.15) and (3.16):
Case 1: If the investor’s choice doesn’t nearly zero out the “first-order term” in the Taylor-expansion-based
estimate of the increment of u, then the market chooses b to make that term positive; quantitatively,
if the investor’s choice f has |f − f∗m| ≥ γε then the market chooses b so that −b(f − f∗m) ≥ 0.
Case 2: When case 1 doesn’t apply, it is convenient to express the investor’s choice f as f = f∗m+εf
#
m+εX ,
where f∗m and f
#
m are defined by (5.22) (this relation defines X). The investor is more optimistic than our
conjectured optimal strategy if X > 0, and more pessimistic if X < 0. In the former case the market makes
the stock go down, and in the latter case it makes the stock go up – in each case giving the investor an
unwelcome surprise; quantitatively:
if the investor’s choice f has |f − f∗m| < γε then the market chooses b so that −bX ≥ 0.
Under conditions on γ analogous to (3.24) and (3.25), an argument entirely parallel to that of Theorem
3.2 produces a sequence (tk,mk, ξk, ηk), starting from any given (t0,m0, ξ0, η0) and ending when k = N =
(T − t0)/ε2 so that tN = T , such that
uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) ≥ uε(t1,m1, ξ1, η1) ≥ · · · ≥ uε(tN ,mN , ξN , ηN ) (5.23)
for which the increments of u satisfy the analogue of (3.22):
Uk = u(tk+1, ξk+1, ηk+1)− u(tk, ξk, ηk) ≥ ε2L(tk,mk, bk, ξk, ηk, f#tk,mk) +O(ε3) (5.24)
Then arguments entirely parallel to the those used for Theorem 5.2 show that
u(tN , ξN , ηN )− u(t0, ξ0, η0) ≥ −C[(T − t0) + ε]ε. (5.25)
The analogue of (5.17) in this setting is of course
|si|∑
j=1
1
|si|
[
(q(mαi,j)− r(mαi,j))2 − bαi,jβmαi,j
]
≥ C∗d , (5.26)
which holds since (β0, . . . , β2d−1, C∗d) is a feasible point for the market’s linear program. Combining
(5.23)–(5.25) with the fact that uε(tN ,mN , ξN , ηN ) = ϕ(tN , ξN , ηN ) = u(tN , ξN , ηN ) gives the desired
lower bound
uε(t0,m0, ξ0, η0) ≥ u(t0, ξ0, η0)− C[(T − t) + ε]ε.
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Remark 5.6. The observations in Remarks 5.3 and 5.4 apply here as well: since the proof of the lower
bound uses only the feasibility (not the optimality) of (β0, . . . , β2d−1, C∗d) for the market’s linear program,
the same argument can be applied using any feasible point for that linear program. For example, to get an
upper bound that’s worse than that of Theorem 5.5 but more explicit, one can take βm = 0 for all m and
replace C∗d in (5.20) by
min
s∈{cycles}
1
|s|
∑
verticesm
on cycle s
(q(m)− r(m))2.
Remark 5.7. We know from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 that C∗d ≤ C#d . Our upper and lower bounds match
asymptotically in the limit ε→ 0 if and only if C∗d = C#d . By Lemmas 4.1(c) and 4.2(c), this relation holds
when there is a strategy that achieves indifference.
5.3 The classic case, when ϕ = 1
2
(η + |ξ|)
The classic goal of minimizing regret with respect to the best-performing expert corresponds to using the
non-smooth final-time data ϕ = (η + |ξ|)/2. In Section 3, which focused on the case d = 1, we showed in
Theorem 3.3 how our upper and lower bounds can be adapted to this case. The proof involved approximating
ϕ by something a bit smoother, then examining the various error terms.
For the general case d ≥ 1, the proofs of our upper and lower bounds (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2) were
largely parallel to the case d = 1. The main difference was in some sense bookkeeping, namely our use of
the cycle decomposition of a closed walk on the relevant graph; for d = 1 the cycle decomposition was so
simple that we avoided discussing it explicitly, though it was implicit in our discussion of (3.10)–(3.14).
In view of the parallels between our bounds for d = 1 and those for the general case d ≥ 1, it is not
surprising that the results in this section can be extended to the classic case ϕ = (η + |ξ|)/2.
Theorem 5.8. Let d ≥ 1 be an integer and consider the classic final-time data ϕ = (η+|ξ|)/2. We consider,
as usual, the function uε(t,m, ξ, η) defined by the dynamic programming principle (2.9) with final-time data
ϕ. Let u+(t, ξ, η) solve our upper-bound PDE (5.1) and let u−(t, ξ, η) solve our lower-bound PDE (5.20),
with final-time data ϕ in both cases. Then there is a constant C (independent of ε, t, and T ) such that
u−(t, ξ, η)− Cε| log ε| ≤ uε(t,m, ξ, η) ≤ u+(t, ξ, η) + Cε| log ε| (5.27)
for all t < T , ξ ∈ R, η ∈ R, and m ∈ {0, 1}d, provided that ε is small enough and t is such that
N = (T − t)/ε2 is an integer.
Proof. The proof requires no new ideas: one simply reviews the proofs of Theorems 5.2 and 5.5, estimating
the magnitude of each error term as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. We leave the details to the reader.
6 Appendix: solving our PDE using the linear heat equation
Our bounds involve solutions of the final-value problem
ut +
1
2
C〈D2u∇
⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉 = 0,
u(T, ξ, η) = ϕ(ξ, η)
(6.1)
with various choices of the “diffusion constant”C. We rely on the existence of a sufficiently smooth solution
with certain qualitative properties, namely (2.28)–(2.31). We asserted in Section 2.5 the existence of such
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a solution under certain conditions upon ϕ, namely (2.36)–(2.39). The main goal of this appendix is to
prove that assertion. We also briefly discuss a geometric interpretation of the PDE, and we give an explicit
formula for u in the classic case ϕ = 12(η + |ξ|). All these results are already known [23], but we present a
self-contained treatment here for the reader’s convenience.
6.1 Motivation
We begin with the observation that if ϕ(ξ, η) satisfies
ϕη ≥ c > 0 (6.2)
for some constant c, then for each y ∈ R there is a unique value g(ξ; y) such that
ϕ(ξ, g(ξ; y)) = y. (6.3)
Thus: for each y the level set {ϕ = y} is the graph of a function ξ 7→ g(ξ; y). These graphs foliate the (ξ, η)
plane and provide an alternative representation of the function ϕ. Implicit differentiation in ξ reveals that
ϕξ + ϕηgξ = 0 and ϕξξ + 2ϕξηgξ + ϕηηg2ξ + ϕηgξξ = 0
when η = g(ξ; y). In view of (6.2) we can solve for gξ and gξξ, obtaining
gξ = − 1
ϕη
ϕξ and gξξ = − 1
ϕ3η
(ϕξξϕ
2
η − 2ϕξηϕξϕη + ϕηηϕ2ξ). (6.4)
There is also a simple formula for gy: differentiation of (6.3) with respect to y gives
gy = 1/ϕη. (6.5)
If we accept that the PDE (6.1) has a solution u(t, ξ, η) with uη > c > 0, then the preceding discussion
applies to it as well (treating the time t as a parameter). So there is a function h(t, ξ; y) such that
u(t, ξ, h(t, ξ; y)) = y (6.6)
for all ξ and y, and all t < T . Differentiation in time gives
ut + uηht = 0
and differentiation with respect to ξ gives the analogue of (6.4):
hξ = − 1
uη
uξ and hξξ = − 1
u3η
(uξξu
2
η − 2uξηuξuη + uηηu2ξ) (6.7)
when η = h(t, ξ; y). Since
〈D2u∇⊥u,∇⊥u〉 = uξξu2η − 2uξηuξuη + uηηu2ξ , (6.8)
we see that (6.1) holds exactly if h(t, ξ; y) solves the linear heat equation
ht +
1
2
Chξξ = 0 (6.9)
for all y and ξ and all t < T , with the final-time condition
h(T, ξ; y) = g(ξ; y). (6.10)
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The hypothesis that uη is positive is consistent with this PDE characterization of h: indeed, differentiating
(6.6) with respect to y gives
uη = 1/hy, (6.11)
and differentiation of (6.9)–(6.10) reveals that
ϕη ≥ c implies uη ≥ c (6.12)
for any constant c > 0, using the maximum principle for the linear heat equation and the relations uη =
1/hη, gη = 1/ϕη.
Summarizing: we have shown that if u exists and is sufficiently smooth, then for each y the level set
{u = y} is the graph of a function h(t, ξ; y), where h solves the final-value problem (6.9)–(6.10) in t and ξ.
6.2 Existence and properties of u
Our construction of u reverses the preceding discussion: we solve the linear heat equation to get h, then use
h to get u.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose ϕ(ξ, η) is a C4 function on R2, with
ϕη ≥ c > 0. (6.13)
for some constant c. While ϕ can (indeed, must) have linear growth at infinity, we assume that ϕξ, ϕη, and
all higher derivatives of order up to 4 are bounded. Then for any positive constantC the final-value problem
ut +
1
2
C〈D2u∇
⊥u
uη
,
∇⊥u
uη
〉 = 0 for t < T
u(T, ξ, η) = ϕ(ξ, η)
(6.14)
has a classical solution u(t, ξ, η) such that
uη ≥ c (6.15)
u has continuous, uniformly bounded derivatives in (ξ, η) of order up to 4 (6.16)
ut has continuous, uniformly bounded derivatives in (ξ, η) of order up to 2, and (6.17)
utt is continuous and uniformly bounded, (6.18)
all bounds being uniform as t ↑ T . Moreover, the following structural properties of ϕ persist to u:
if |ϕξ| ≤ ϕη for all ξ, η, then |uξ| ≤ uη for all ξ, η and all t ≤ T ; (6.19)
if ϕξξϕ2η − 2ϕξηϕξϕη + ϕηηϕ2ξ ≥ 0 for all ξ, η, then ut ≤ 0 for all ξ, η and all t ≤ T ; (6.20)
if ϕ is odd in ξ then so is u. (6.21)
Proof. We begin with the level-set representation of ϕ, i.e. with the function g(ξ; y) defined by (6.3). To
assess the smoothness of g we apply the inverse function theorem to the maps G and Φ defined by
(ξ, y)
G→ (ξ, g(ξ; y)) and (ξ, η) Φ→ (ξ, ϕ(ξ, η)). (6.22)
The relation ϕ(ξ, g(ξ; y)) = y says that Φ ◦ G is the identity map, so G is the inverse of Φ. The Jacobian
of Φ is uniformly bounded and positive, by (6.13). It follows, by the inverse function theorem (see e.g. [8])
that G has the same smoothness as Φ; in particular, since ϕ has uniformly bounded derivatives of order up
to 4, so does g.
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Now consider the solution h(t, ξ; y) of the final-value problem (6.9)–(6.10). Differentiating the PDE
in ξ and/or y and applying the maximum principle for the linear heat equation, we see that the derivatives
of h in ξ, y of order up to 4 are uniformly bounded. Since gy is uniformly positive as well as uniformly
bounded (by (6.5)), the same is true of hy. So for each t, the graphs η = h(t, ξ; y) foliate the (ξ, η) plane as
y varies, determining a unique function u such that (6.6) holds. The arguments in Section 6.1 show that u is
a classical solution of the PDE (6.14), and that uη ≥ c. To assess its regularity in ξ and η, we observe that
for each fixed t the functions
(ξ, y)→ (ξ, h(t, ξ; y)) and (ξ, η)→ (ξ, u(t, ξ, η))
are inverse to one another; so the regularity of h implies, via the inverse function theorem, that u has
uniformly bounded derivatives of order up to 4 in ξ and η. The regularity of u in t is best assessed using the
PDE: since 〈D2u∇⊥uuη , ∇
⊥u
uη
〉 has bounded second spatial derivatives, so does ut. It follows immediately (by
differentiating the PDE in t) that utt is also uniformly bounded.
Turning now to qualitative properties, recall from (6.4) and (6.7) that |ϕξ| ≤ ϕη is equivalent to |gξ| ≤ 1,
and |uξ| ≤ uη is equivalent to |hξ| ≤ 1. Since |gξ| ≤ 1 implies |hξ| ≤ 1 by the maximum principle for the
linear heat equation, (6.19) is clear.
Next, recall from (6.4)–(6.8) that ϕξξϕ2η − 2ϕξηϕξϕη + ϕηηϕ2ξ ≥ 0 is equivalent to gξξ ≤ 0, while
uξξu
2
η − 2uξηuξuη + uηηu2ξ ≥ 0 is equivalent to both hξξ ≤ 0 and ut ≤ 0. Since hξξ solves a linear heat
equation with gξξ as final-time data, (6.20) follows once again from the maximum principle for the linear
heat equation.
Finally, recall from (6.3) and (6.6) that ϕ(ξ, η) = ϕ(−ξ, η) is equivalent to g(ξ) = g(−ξ), and u(ξ, η) =
u(−ξ, η) is equivalent to h(t, ξ, η) = h(t,−ξ, η). So (6.21) follows from the fact that the solution of a linear
heat equation is odd if the final-time data are odd.
6.3 Geometric interpretation of u
We have shown that for each y, the evolution of the level set u = y can be found without considering
any other level sets (by solving a linear heat equation). Second-order parabolic PDE’s with this property
are called “geometric,” because the normal velocity of each level set can be written in terms of its normal
direction and curvature [12].
It is natural to ask what our PDE (6.1) looks like from this perspective (though the main part of our
paper makes no use of this result). The answer is that the normal velocity of the level set {u = y}, viewed
as a curve in the (ξ, η) plane, is related to the level set’s unit normal ~n and curvature κ by
vnor = −C
2
|∇u|2
|uη|2 κ = −
C
2(~n · (0, 1))2κ. (6.23)
Indeed, the curvature of a level set
κ = −div
( ∇u
|∇u|
)
has the property that
〈D2u∇
⊥u
|∇u| ,
∇⊥u
|∇u| 〉 = −κ|∇u|,
so the PDE (6.1) says
ut =
1
2
Cκ
|∇u|3
u2η
.
This leads directly to (6.23), since the velocity of the level set is (by definition) vnor = −ut/|∇u| and the
unit normal is ~n = (uξ, uη)/|∇u|.
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6.4 Explicit solution for the classic final-time data
As we observed in the Introduction, in the classic case ϕ = 12(η + |∇ξ|) the solution of (6.1) has the form
u = 12η + u(t, ξ), where u solves the linear heat equation ut +
1
2Cuξξ = 0 for t < T with u(T, ξ) =
1
2 |ξ|.
It is amusing to observe that this function u has an explicit formula, namely
u(t, ξ) =
√
T − tG
(
ξ/
√
T − t
)
(6.24)
where
G(z) =
√
C
2pi
exp
(−z2
2C
)
+
z
2
erf
(
z√
2C
)
(6.25)
(with the usual convention that erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0 e
−s2 ds, so that erf(x) → 1 as x → ∞). Indeed, a brief
calculation reveals that a function of the form (6.24) solves the desired PDE exactly if G solves
G(z)− zG′(z)− CG′′(z) = 0,
and it is easy to check that the proposed function G (given by (6.25)) meets this requirement. Turning to the
final-time behavior: it is easy to check that our G satisfies
lim
z→∞
G(z)
z
=
1
2
and lim
z→−∞
G(z)
z
= −1
2
,
and it follows that
lim
t→T
u(t, ξ) = |ξ|/2
as expected.
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